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We reassess the effect of state and federal minimum wages on U.S. earnings inequality, attending
to two issues that appear to bias earlier work: violation of the assumed independence of state wage
levels and state wage dispersion, and errors-in-variables that inflate impact estimates via an analogue
of the well known division bias problem.  We find that erosion of the real minimum wage raises inequality
in the lower tail of the wage distribution (the 50/10 wage ratio), but the impacts are typically less than
half as large as those reported in the literature and are almost negligible for males. Nevertheless, the
estimated effects of the minimum wage on points of the wage distribution extend to wage percentiles
where the minimum is nominally non-binding, implying spillovers.  We structurally estimate these
spillovers and show that their relative importance grows as the nominal minimum wage becomes less
binding. Subsequent analysis underscores, however, that spillovers and measurement error (absent
spillovers) have similar implications for the effect of the minimum on the shape of the lower tail of
the measured wage distribution. With available precision, we cannot reject the hypothesis that estimated
spillovers to non-binding percentiles are due to reporting artifacts.  Accepting this null, the implied
effect of the minimum wage on the actual wage distribution is smaller than the effect of the minimum























While economists have vigorously debated the effect of the minimum wage on employment 
levels for at least six decades (cf. Stigler, 1946), its contribution to the evolution of earnings 
inequality—that is, the shape of the earnings distribution—was largely overlooked prior to the 
seminal 1996 contribution of DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (DFL hereafter). Using kernel density 
techniques, DFL produced overwhelming visual evidence that the minimum wage substantially 
‘held up’ the lower tail of the US earnings distribution in 1979, yielding a pronounced spike in 
hourly earnings at the nominal minimum value, particularly for females. By 1988, however, this 
spike had virtually disappeared. Simultaneously, the inequality of hourly earnings increased 
markedly in both the upper and lower halves of the wage distribution. Most relevant to this 
paper, the 10/50 (‘lower tail’) log hourly earnings ratio expanded by 8 to 23 log points between 
1979 and 1988, with the largest increases among females and the smallest among males (Table 
1). To assess the causes of this rise, DFL constructed counterfactual wage distributions that 
potentially account for the impact of changing worker characteristics, labor demand, union 
penetration, and minimum wages on the shape of the wage distribution. Comparing 
counterfactual with observed wage densities, DFL concluded that the erosion of the federal 
minimum wage—which declined in real terms by 30 log points between 1979 and 1988—was 
the predominant cause of rising lower tail inequality between 1979 and 1988, explaining two-
thirds of the growth of the 10/50 for both males and females.
1
Though striking, a well-understood limitation of the DFL findings is that the estimated 
counterfactual wage distributions derive exclusively from reweighting  of observed wage 
densities rather than controlled comparisons. Thus, they are closer in spirit to simulation than 
to inference. Cognizant of this limitation, DFL highlight in their conclusion that the expansion of 
lower tail inequality during 1979 to 1988 was noticeably more pronounced in ‘low-wage’ than 
‘high-wage states,’ consistent with the hypothesis that the falling federal minimum caused a 
differential increase in lower tail equality in states where the minimum wage was initially more 
binding. Building on this observation, Lee (1999) exploits  cross-state variation in the gap 
  
                                                        
1 DFL attribute 62 percent of the growth of the female 10/50 and 65 percent of the growth of the male 10/50 to 
the declining value of the minimum wage (Table III). 2 
 
between state median wages and the applicable federal or state minimum wage (the ‘effective 
minimum’) to estimate what the share of the observed rise in wage inequality from 1979 
through 1988 was due to the falling minimum rather than changes in underlying (‘latent’) wage 
inequality. Amplifying the findings of DFL, Lee concludes that more than the entire rise of lower 
tail earnings inequality—by which we mean, the 50/10 earnings differential—between 1979 
and 1988  was due to the falling federal minimum wage; had the minimum been constant 
throughout this period, observed wage inequality would have fallen.
2
These influential findings present two key puzzles that motivate the current paper. The first 
is that the Lee analysis uncovers and scrupulously reports causal effects estimates that clearly 
violate the paper’s main falsification tests. In particular, the estimates imply that the declining 
federal minimum wage significantly reduced the growth of upper tail (90/50) inequality in both 
the male and pooled-gender wage distributions between 1979 and 1991.
  
3
The first goal of the current paper is to identify and amend these econometric issues. We 
show that the reduced form OLS models used in the literature suffer from two first-order 
sources of bias. One is garden-variety omitted variables bias. The main estimating equations 
used by Lee (1999) exclude state fixed effects, which is not problematic provided that there is 
no correlation between states’ median wage levels (which proxy for the ‘bindingess’ of the 
federal minimum wage) and states’ underlying wage variances. In violation of this assumption, 
we show that median state log wages and log wage variances are strongly positively correlated, 
even in portions of the distribution where the variance of wages is unlikely to be affected by 
the minimum wage (such as the 60/40 gap). Consequently, state fixed effects, and potentially 
state trends, are needed for consistent estimation.  
 This startling but 
nevertheless robust result suggests potential problems in the econometric strategy.  
                                                        
2 Using cross-region rather than cross-state variation in the ‘bindingness’ of minimum wages, Teulings (2000 and 
2003) reaches similar conclusions. See also Mishel, Bernstein and Allegretto (2006, chapter 3) for an assessment of 
the minimum wage’s effect on wage inequality.  
3 See Lee (1999) Table II. The large, positive and highly significant coefficients in this table imply that a 1 log point 
increase in the effective minimum wage (defined as the difference between the log state minimum wage and the 
log state median wage) reduces male and pooled-gender 90/50 log wage inequality by 0.16 to 0.44 log points.  3 
 
The second problem we document in existing estimates is a variant of the well known 
division bias problem (Borjas, 1980), which arises from including state median wages on both 
sides of the regression equation—in the main independent variable (the proxy for the minimum 
wage’s bindingness) and in the dependent variable (the 50/10 wage gap). This is problematic 
inasmuch as sampling variation in the median wage can  induce a mechanical correlation 
between the dependent and independent variables. Indeed, Lee (1999) is aware of this 
problem.  His preferred specification has two different measures of the central tendency of 
wages (a median and a trimmed mean) on the left and right hand sides in an attempt to deal 
with this problem.  However, we show that these different measures are still likely to have a 
high correlation induced by sampling variation such that division bias remains a problem.
4
Correcting both econometric issues substantially affects inference. Between 1979 and 1988, 
50/10 wage inequality in the female, male and pooled distributions rose by 23, 8 and 11 log 
points, respectively. Conventional OLS estimates indicate that the falling real minimum wage 
accounted for almost the entirety of the observed increases. Had the minimum been at its real 
1988 level in both 1979 and 1988, OLS models imply that 50/10 wage inequality would have 
risen by only 3 log points for females, and would not have risen at all for males and the pooled 
distribution. By contrast, 2SLS models find that, under the same counterfactual assumptions, 
female  50/10 inequality would have risen by 15 log points, and male and pooled gender 
inequality by 7 log points each. Graphical comparisons of OLS, 2SLS and quantile regression 
  We 
show that division bias is a substantial problem for OLS estimates, and we correct for it by 
instrumenting the effective minimum with the statutory minimum wage in each state and year 
(which does suffer from sampling variation). This canonical technique  for correcting 
measurement error, due to Durbin (1954), was also used by Card, Katz and Krueger (1993) in 
their reanalysis of the employment effects of the minimum wage.  
                                                        
4 Ironically, the problem of division bias is exacerbated by the fix to the omitted variables problem; adding state 
effects increases the share of residual variation that is due to noise rather than signal. Cognizant of the possibility 
of division bias, Lee takes a number of steps to minimize its impact. These steps do not appear to fully resolve the 
problem, as we show below. It is precisely because of the concern about division bias that Lee excludes state fixed 
effects from the primary estimates.   4 
 
estimates over the full thirty year sample period reinforce the conclusion that OLS models are 
unreliable.  
After accounting for the econometric issues in earlier OLS estimates, a second  puzzle 
remains. Between 1979 and 2009, no more than nine percent of all workers, and six percent of 
all male workers, were paid at or below the federal or applicable state minimum wage (see 
Figure 1 and Table 1, column 8); only for females (and only for a few years at the beginning of 
our sample) was the minimum wage directly binding at or above the 10
th percentile.
5 This 
observation implies that any impact of the minimum wage on 50/10 male and pooled gender 
wage inequality must be due to a spillover effect, whereby the minimum wage raises the wages 
of workers earning above the minimum.
6
In the second part of our paper, we provide  estimates  of  these spillovers and  we  test 
whether spillovers are plausibly large enough to account for the causal effects attributed to 
them.  We model each state’s latent wage distribution as log-normal, and estimate  the 
parameters of these distributions using wage observations from higher percentiles of the 
distribution, where the minimum wage is unlikely to be relevant. Armed with these estimates, 
we calculate the mechanical impact of the minimum wage by truncating the lower tail of the 
(estimated) latent distribution at the statutory minimum, and inferring spillovers by comparing 
the ‘mechanical’ distribution with the observed distribution.
 Such spillovers are a potentially important and little 
understood effect of minimum wage laws. 
7
                                                        
5 More precisely, these numbers refer to the distribution of paid hours, which weights the earnings distribution by 
hours worked.  
 Notably, while the sources of 
identifying variation for the structural estimation are almost entirely distinct from the reduced 
form analysis, the two approaches find largely comparable effects of the minimum wage on 
inequality. 
6 We assume no disemployment effects at the modest minimum wage levels mandated in the US, an assumption 
that is supported by a large recent literature (e.g., Card, Katz and Krueger, 1993; Card and Krueger, 2000; Neumark 
and Wascher, 2000).  
7  The ambitious paper by Teulings (2003) also estimates minimum wage spillovers under a set of flexible 
parametric assumptions using variation in the bindingness of the minimum wage across four U.S. regions (South, 
Midwest, Northeast, West) between 1973 and 1991. The Teuling’s estimates find very large spillovers, but these 
estimates appear to suffer from the same two sources of bias that we document below for state by time panel 
estimates.  5 
 
Spillovers appear to be a significant component of the impact of the minimum wage on the 
wage distribution. At its highest level (in 1979), the minimum wage compressed the female 
50/10 wage ratio by 18 log points. This large compressing effect was primarily a direct result of 
the minimum wage propping up lower wage percentiles. As the real minimum wage fell over 
the subsequent decade, however, the share of the minimum wage’s impact accounted for by 
spillovers rose. In 2009, we estimate that the minimum wage compressed female 50/10 wage 
inequality by 12 log points, half of which was due to spillovers.  Logically, we estimate that the 
modest effects of the minimum on the male and pooled gender distributions are due entirely to 
spillovers.  
We  finally  explore  whether the spillovers  found  in  our samples, based on the Current 
Population Survey, may result from measurement error in wage reporting rather than from true 
spillovers.  This  can  occur if a fraction of minimum wage workers report their wages 
inaccurately, leading to a hump in the wage distribution centered on the minimum wage rather 
than (or in addition to) a spike at the minimum. After bounding the potential magnitude of 
these measurement errors, we are unable to reject the hypothesis that the apparent spillover 
from the minimum wage to higher (non-covered) percentiles is spurious. That is, while the 
spillovers are present in the data, they may not be present in the distribution of wages actually 
paid. These results do not rule out the possibility of true spillovers. But they underscore that 
estimated spillovers must be treated with caution since they cannot be distinguished from 
measurement artifacts with available precision.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I discusses data and sources of identification. 
Section II presents the measurement framework and estimates a set of causal effects estimates 
models that, like Lee (1999), explicitly account for the bite of the minimum wage in estimating 
its effect on the wage distribution. We compare parameterized OLS and 2SLS models and 
document the pitfalls that arise in the OLS estimation. Section III uses point estimates from the 
main regression models to calculate counterfactual changes in wage inequality, holding the real 
minimum wage constant. Section IV presents estimates of both the direct and spillover effects 
of the minimum wage derived from parametric estimates of the latent wage distribution. 6 
 
Section V analyzes the extent to which apparent spillovers may be due to measurement error. 
The final section concludes. 
I.  Change in the federal minimum wage and variation in state minimum wages 
In July of 2007, the real value of the U.S. Federal minimum wage fell to a fifty year low 
(Figure 2). This outcome reflects three decades of nearly continual decline in the real minimum 
wage from a 1979 high point, including two decade-long spans in which the minimum wage 
remained fixed in nominal terms—1981 through 1990, and 1997 through 2007—only slightly 
offset by two modest increases in 1991 and 1998, followed by substantial increases in both 
2008 and 2009. An important difference between the most recent decade, however, and the 
several that precede it is that numerous states now legislate minimum wages that exceed the 
federal level. At the end of the 1980s, 15 states’ minimum wages exceeded the federal level; by 
2008, this number had reached 32 (subsequently reduced to 27 by the 2009 federal minimum 
wage increase). Consequently, the real value of the minimum wage applicable to the average 
worker in 2007 was not much lower than in 1997, and was significantly higher than if states had 
not enacted their own minimum wages. Moreover, the most recent federal increases bring the 
minimum wage faced by the average worker up to a real level not seen since the mid 1980s. 
Appendix Table 1 illustrates the extent of state minimum wage variation between 1979 and 
2009. 
These differences in legislated minimum wages across states and over time are one of two 
sources of variation that we use to identify the impact of the minimum wage on the wage 
distribution. The second source of variation we use, following Lee (1999), is variation in the 
‘bindingness’ of the minimum wage, stemming from the idea that a given legislated minimum 
wage should have a larger effect on the shape of the wage distribution in a state with a lower 
wage level. Table 1 provides examples. In  each year, there is significant variation in the 
percentile of the state wage distribution where the state or federal minimum wage “binds.” For 
instance, in 1979 the minimum wage bound at the 12
th  percentile of the female wage 
distribution for the median state, but it bound at the 3
rd percentile in Alaska and the 28
th 
percentile in Mississippi. This variation in the “bite” or “bindingness” of the minimum wage was 7 
 
due mainly to cross-state differences in wage levels in 1979, since only Alaska had a state 
minimum wage that exceeded the federal minimum. In later years, particularly the current 
decade, this variation was also due to differences in the value of state minimum wages. 
A.  Sample and variable construction 
Our analysis uses the percentiles of states’ annual wage distributions as the primary 
outcomes of interest. We form these samples by pooling all individual responses from the 
Current Population Survey Merged Outgoing Rotation Group (CPS MORG) for each year. We use 
the reported hourly wage for those who report being paid by the hour, otherwise we calculate 
the hourly wage as weekly earnings divided by hours worked in the prior week. We limit the 
sample to individuals age 18 through 64, and we multiply top-coded values by 1.5. We exclude 
self-employed individuals and those with wages imputed by the BLS. To reduce the influence of 
outliers, we Winsorize the top two percentiles of the wage distribution in each state, year, sex 
grouping (male, female or pooled) by assigning the 97
th percentile value to the 98
th and 99
th 
percentiles. Using these individual wage data, we calculate all percentiles of state wage 
distributions by sex for 1979-2009, weighting individual observations by their CPS sampling 
weight multiplied by their weekly hours worked.  
Our primary analysis is performed at the state-year level, but minimum wages often change 
part way through the year. We address this issue by assigning the value of the minimum wage 
that was in effect for the longest time throughout the calendar year in a state and year. For 
those states and years in which more than one minimum wage was in effect for six months in 
the year, the maximum of the two is used. We have also tried assigning the maximum of the 
minimum wage within a year as the applicable minimum wage, and this leaves our conclusions 
unchanged.  
II.  OLS and 2SLS estimation of minimum wage effects on the wage distribution 
A.  Regression specification 
The effect of the minimum wage on wage inequality will naturally depend in part on how 
high the statutory minimum wage is set relative to the overall distribution of wages—its 8 
 
‘bindingness.’ Bindingness is of course intrinsically unobservable since the econometrician 
cannot measure the counterfactual (‘latent’) wage distribution absent the minimum wage. As a 
proxy measure of bindingness, Lee (1999) proposes using the gap between the log of the 
statutory state minimum and log state median wage (𝑤𝑠𝑡
𝑚 − 𝑤𝑠𝑡(50)), which he terms the 
‘effective minimum’. Denoting  𝑤𝑠𝑡(𝑝) and 𝑤𝑠𝑡
∗ (𝑝) as the actual and latent values of percentile 
p, and allowing 𝗽1  and  𝗽2  to vary by percentile, Lee’s primary empirical specification is 
motivated by the following equation: 
    𝑤𝑠𝑡(𝑝) − 𝑤𝑠𝑡(50)
= �𝑤𝑠𝑡
∗ (𝑝) − 𝑤𝑠𝑡
∗ (50)�+ 𝗽1�𝑤𝑠𝑡
𝑚 − 𝑤𝑠𝑡(50)�+ 𝗽2(𝑤𝑠𝑡
𝑚 − 𝑤𝑠𝑡(50))2 + 𝜀𝑠𝑡 
(1)  
That is, the value of any percentile relative to the median is a function of latent inequality at 
percentile p and a quadratic in the bindingness of the minimum wage for state s in year t.  
Operationalizing (1) requires making assumptions about the underlying latent wage 
distribution.  Lee (1999) assumes the following:  
1.  The latent wage distribution can be summarized by two parameters, the median and 
the variance, so that we can write: 
    𝑤𝑠𝑡
∗ (𝑝) = 𝜇𝑠𝑡 + 𝜎𝑠𝑡𝐹−1(𝑝)  (2)   
And, we have the normalization 𝐹−1(50) = 0 so that 𝜇𝑠𝑡 is the median log wage in state 𝑠 at 
time 𝑡. 
2.  Cross-state variation in latent wage inequality is uncorrelated with the median:   
(    𝜎𝑠𝑡 ⊥ 𝜇𝑠𝑡|𝑡  (3)  
Equipped with these assumptions, Lee estimates the following as his primary empirical 
specification: 
𝑤𝑠𝑡(𝑝) − 𝑤𝑠𝑡(50) = 𝗼𝑡 + 𝗽1�𝑤𝑠𝑡
𝑚 − 𝑤𝑠𝑡(50)� + 𝗽2(𝑤𝑠𝑡
𝑚 − 𝑤𝑠𝑡(50))2 + 𝜀𝑠𝑡  (4)  
The two above assumptions justify three noteworthy features of equation (4). First, because 
any cross-state variation in latent wage inequality is assumed to be uncorrelated with state 
medians conditional on time, explicit controls for state variances, 𝜎𝑠𝑡, can be replaced with a 9 
 
set of time dummies in the estimating equation without biasing estimates of 𝗽1 and 𝗽2. State 
dummies are not required under these assumptions and are not present.  
Second, the assumed independence of state wage medians and latent state wage dispersion 
implies that any association between the effective minimum and the observed 10/50 
differential in (4) reflects the causal impact of the minimum on the lower tail of the wage 
distribution. Specifically, if the observed state median 𝑤𝑠𝑡(50) is an adequate measure of 𝜇𝑠𝑡, 
and recalling the normalization that 𝐹−1(50) = 0, we have:  
   cov��𝑤𝑠𝑡
∗ (𝑝) − 𝑤𝑠𝑡
∗ (50)�,�𝑤𝑠𝑡
𝑚 − 𝑤𝑠𝑡(50)�|𝑡� = cov[𝜎𝑠𝑡𝐹−1(50),(𝑤𝑠𝑡
𝑚 − 𝜇𝑠𝑡)|𝑡] = 0  (5)  
Finally, note that the log of the observed state median is included in both the dependent 
and independent variables of the regression equation, which can be rationalized under the 
assumption that the median provides a natural measure of the statutory minimum’s 
bindingness.  Moreover, it is independent of latent state wage variances  by the second 
assumption above.   
B.  OLS estimates 
Column 1 of Tables 2A, 2B, and 2C present estimates of equation (4) for the marginal effects 
of the effective minimum for selected percentiles, when marginal effects are estimated at the 
weighted average of the effective minimum over all states and all years between 1979 and 
2009.  For the regressions represented by column 1, equation (4) is estimated separately for 
each listed percentile and separately for males, females, and the pooled distribution; the 
covariates are year fixed effects, the effective minimum, and the square of the effective 
minimum.  Looking at the lower percentiles, we find, as Lee did, large significant effects of the 
minimum wage extending throughout all percentiles below the median for the male, female 
and pooled wage distributions.   
However, there are indications that this approach is misspecified.  As shown in the left-hand 
panels of Figure 3, which plots the estimated marginal effects of the minimum wage at each 
percentile, we estimate large effects of the effective minimum at the top of the male wage 
distribution, and modest effects at the top of pooled wage distribution. Taken at face value, 10 
 
these results  indicate  a systematic relationship between the effective minimum wage and 
upper wage percentiles of the male and pooled distributions—specifically, that a decline in the 
effective minimum wage causes wage compression at the top of the distribution. Since the 
minimum wage fell sharply during the 1980s, these estimates imply that the steep increase in 
upper-tail inequality in this decade would have been even larger were it not for the falling 
minimum.  
Lee also scrupulously reports similarly problematic results for upper-tail wage inequality.
8
C.  Addressing misspecification: Omitted variables 
 
To circumvent the problems posed by the male estimates, Lee uses exclusively the pooled 
distribution point estimates when constructing implied changes in latent wage inequality for 
the  female, male and pooled  distributions.  While this  approach is well motivated, it may 
nevertheless be inadequate if the specification issues that appear to bias the male estimates 
are also present for females and the pooled distribution. We show below that these biases 
appear to afflict all three samples.  
To address the probable misspecification of equation  (4), we first explore whether the 
identifying assumption that state latent wage inequality is uncorrelated with the median is 
violated. We regress the log(60)-log(40) on the median (which should be uncorrelated if the 
density function is symmetric around the median and the minimum does not affect the 40
th 
percentile) and time dummies (to capture the controls put in equation (4)).  As shown in Table 
3, the log median has a t-statistic of 17.2 for females, 4.4 for men and 14.6 for the combined 
sample.  This suggests that those states with high median wages have high levels of latent wage 
inequality.   
Since  these results seemingly indicate permanent differences in latent wage inequality 
across states, state fixed effects should be included in the estimation of (4). Lee also reports 
this type of specification (Tables II and III), and we display estimates from the OLS estimation of 
(4) with state fixed effects and time trends in column 2 of Tables 2A, 2B, and 2C. The marginal 
                                                        
8  These upper-tail correlations are found both in Lee’s main estimation for 1979 through 1988 and the 
complementary estimates for 1989 through 1991, which exploit the sharp rise in the nominal federal minimum 
wage in two steps between April 1990 and April 1991 from $3.35 to $4.25.  11 
 
effects as implied by these estimates are plotted in Figures 3B, 3D, and 3F.  We view the 
inclusion of state time trends as important in controlling for shocks to the wage distribution 
that are correlated with changes in minimum wages, and we take column 2 to represent 
baseline estimates before correcting for potential measurement error through instrumental 
variables.
9
D.  Addressing misspecification: Division bias 
  As evident in Figure 3, this potential fix exacerbates the  anomalous upper-tail 
results. The relationship between the effective minimum wage and upper percentiles remains 
pronounced for both males and the pooled distribution, and is now also sizable and significant 
for females.  
An obvious source of misspecification in these estimates is division bias (Borjas, 1980). 
Division bias stems from the inclusion of the state median wage variable in both the dependent 
and independent variables  in  (4), which induces an artificial positive correlation  caused by 
sampling variation. This is likely to lead to upward simultaneity bias in the estimates, since the 
median enters with the same sign on both sides of the equation. This problem potentially 
becomes more severe when state fixed effects are included, as more of the remaining variation 
is the result of sampling variation.  
Lee (1999) recognizes  this concern  and attempts to address it by using two different 
measures of central tendency in the dependent and independent variables:  the median of the 
dependent variable on the left-hand side, and the trimmed mean on the right (that is, the mean 
after excluding the bottom and top 30 percentiles).  Although this procedure does reduce the 
correlation, it does not eliminate it. One can show, for example, that if the latent log wage 
distribution is normal, the correlation between the trimmed mean and the median will be 
about 0.93—i.e. not unity, but very high.
10
Using the same approach as Card and Krueger (1993) in their analysis of the employment 
effects of the minimum wage, we address the division bias problem  by instrumenting the 
  
                                                        
9 Recent work on the employment effects of the minimum wage have argued for the inclusion of state trends for 
this reason. See, for instance, Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2008). 
10 See the derivation in section A of the Appendix. 12 
 
effective minimum with the statutory minimum wage in each state and year.
11 The utility of the 
statutory minimum wage in this application is that it does not suffer from sampling variation. 
Assuming that legislated changes in the minimum wage are not correlated with changes in 
latent state wage inequality conditional on year effects and state and year trends, this 
instrument will capture exogenous variation in the effective minimum that is uncorrelated with 
the measurement error in state medians.
12  Similarly, to capture exogenous variation in the 
square of the effective minimum (i.e., to allow for non-linear effects of bindingness), we square 
the  predicted value from a regression of the effective minimum wage on the legislated 
minimum and year and state dummies (and state-time trends, if included in the second 
stage)—which is essentially the square of the first stage estimate for the effective minimum.
13
Figure 4 demonstrates the efficacy of this approach for two specifications that control for 
state effects: estimation of (4) in levels and including state fixed effects and state time trends 
(Figures 4A, 4C, and 4E), and estimation of the first-differenced version of (4) and including 
state fixed effects (Figures 4B, 4D, and 4F).  We prefer the first-differenced estimates (column 
4) because first-differencing places fewer restrictions on the error structure.
 
One drawback of this instrument is that there is quite limited cross-state variation in the 
legislated minimum wage during the 1980s (and all federal variation in the minimum wage is 
absorbed by year dummies). Consequently, the instrument has tenuous identifying power when 
used with data that is exclusively from the 1980s. 
14
                                                        
11  The statutory minimum is the maximum of the federal minimum wage and the state’s minimum wage. 
  When the 
effective minimum wage and its square are instrumented by the statutory minimum, the 
12 Dropping the median from one or both sides of the estimating equation would also solve the simultaneity 
problem, but this would discard a key component of the identification, which exploits the fact that the effect of the 
minimum wage on wage inequality will depend in part on the minimum’s position in the latent wage distribution. 
Hence, we retain the median but use 2SLS to solve the simultaneity problem.  
13 The instruments for the first-differenced analogue are ∆𝑤𝑠𝑡
𝑚 and ∆(𝑤𝑠𝑡
𝑚 − 𝑤(50)𝑠𝑡)2 � , where ∆𝑤𝑠𝑡
𝑚 represents 
the annual change in the log of the legislated minimum wage and ∆(𝑤𝑠𝑡
𝑚 − 𝑤(50)𝑠𝑡)2 �  represents the change in the 
square of the predicted value for the effective minimum wage. This procedure is recommended by Wooldridge, 
2002 (section 9.5.2).   
14 Estimating (4) in levels assumes that errors are serially uncorrelated, while the first-differenced specification is 
more efficient if the errors are a random walk (Wooldridge 2002). 13 
 
positive correlation between the effective minimum and upper tail percentiles  almost 
completely disappears.  
Of equal importance, instrumentation also reduces the estimated impact of the minimum 
wage elsewhere in the wage distribution, a result that is consistent with a reduction in division 
bias.  To summarize these results, columns  3  and  4  of Table 2 present 2SLS estimates of 
marginal effects for various percentiles. These 2SLS estimates imply that the minimum wage 
has a statistically significant impact up through the 25
th percentile or so for women, up through 
the 10
th percentile for men, and up through the 15
th percentile or so for the pooled wage 
distribution. 2SLS estimates imply that a 10 log point increase in the effective minimum wage 
reduces 50-10 inequality by 1.5 to 3 log points for women, by 0.7 to 0.9 log points for men, and 
by 1.6 to 2.2 log points for the pooled distribution.  These estimates are less than half as large 
as those found by the baseline OLS specification. 
E.  Specification checks: Quantile and reduced form estimates 
Our estimates so far are performed using percentiles of state annual wage distributions, 
which are  aggregate statistics calculated from microdata. As a specification test, we also 
estimate comparable models using microdata and applying conditional quantile regressions. 
We begin with a quantile regression analogue of equation (4): 











Figure 5 display estimates of this quantile model.
15
(6)
 Perhaps not surprisingly, the quantile 
regression estimates of    are  similarly problematic to OLS estimates of equation  (6).  We 
estimate large effects of the effective minimum at the top of the male wage distribution, which 
suggests that the quantile model suffers from the specification biases above. Similarly, a logical 
remedy is to add state fixed effects to (6) while instrumenting the effective minimum wage with 
the statutory minimum. Applying quantile instrumental variables (Chernozhukov and Hansen, 
2005) in this setting would present a major computational challenge, however, due to the large 
sample sizes.  
                                                        
15 For brevity, we perform estimates for both females and males but not for the pooled distribution. 14 
 
In lieu of this technique, we implement a reduced form approach that should perform 
similarly. Recall that the purpose of instrumentation in our application is to purge sampling 
error in estimated state median wages that would otherwise generate division bias in the 
regression model. We can accomplish a similar objective by using predicted rather than 
observed state medians in equation (6). In particular, we fit the following equation:  
   𝑤𝑠𝑡(50) = 𝗼𝑡 + 𝗾𝑠 + (𝗾𝑠 × 𝑡) + 𝑒𝑠𝑡,  (7)  
which models state median wages as a function of time effects, state effects, state-specific time 
trends, and an error term. We calculate the ‘reduced form effective minimum’ (and its square) 
as  𝑚𝑤 � 𝑠𝑡 = �𝑤𝑠𝑡
𝑚 − 𝑤 �𝑠𝑡(50)�, where 𝑤 �𝑠𝑡(50)  is equal to the regression prediction from 
equation (7), and we use it in place of the measured effective minimum in a quantile regression 
that includes state fixed effects and state trends:  
   𝑄𝜃[𝑤𝑠𝑡(𝑝) − 𝑤𝑠𝑡(50)|𝑡,𝑠,𝑤𝑠𝑡
𝑚 − 𝑤𝑠𝑡(50)] = 𝗼𝑡
𝜃 + 𝗾𝑠 + (𝗾𝑠 × 𝑡) + 𝗽1
𝜃𝑚𝑤 � 𝑠𝑡 + 𝗽2
𝜃𝑚𝑤 � 𝑠𝑡
2   (8)  
Before applying this technique to the quantile model, we perform a ‘proof of concept’ by 
estimating equation (8)  using  OLS. If this reduced form technique works as expected, OLS 
estimates of (8) should be comparable to earlier 2SLS estimates of this equation, i.e., where the 
effective minimum is instrumented by the statutory minimum (see Table 2 column 3). Figure 5 
confirms this conjecture: 2SLS and reduced form estimates of this equation are nearly 
indistinguishable.
16
The fourth series in Figure 5 plots the quantile reduced form estimates for the implied 
impacts of the minimum wage on the male and female distributions. These point estimates are 
highly comparable to the 2SLS models. And to the extent they differ, they find slightly smaller 
impacts of the effective minimum on both male and female wage inequality in the lowest two 
deciles. (In this respect, they are similar to our 2SLS first difference estimates in Table 2, column 
4.) Reassuringly, these quantile estimates find no correlation between the effective minimum 
and changes in upper percentiles for either sex.  
  
                                                        
16 Note that because 𝑚𝑤 � 𝑠𝑡 is a regression predicted value, it will have a first stage coefficient of approximately one 
in a model where 𝑚𝑤 � 𝑠𝑡 is instrumented by the statutory minimum wage (with time and state dummies and state 
specific trends included). Consequently, reduced-form and 2SLS estimates of (8) produce point estimates of closely 
comparable magnitude.  15 
 
In net, the models summarized in Figure 5 indicate that the pooled model developed by Lee 
(1999) for estimating the impact of the minimum wage on wage inequality do not appear to be 
reliable, whether estimated using OLS or quantile regressions. Conversely, augmented models 
that both allow for state effects and trends and also purge correlated measurement error in the 
effective minimum wage measure perform well whether estimated by 2SLS, or in quasi-reduced 
form, using either OLS or quantile regressions.   
III.  Estimating the counterfactual change in inequality holding the minimum wage constant 
How much of the expansion in lower-tail wage inequality since 1979 was due to the 
declining minimum wage? Following Lee (1999), we present counterfactual estimates of the 
change in latent
To estimate changes in latent wage inequality, Lee (1999) proposes the following simple 
procedure. For each observation in the dataset, calculate its rank in its respective state-year 
wage distribution. Then, adjust each wage by the quantity:  
 wage inequality absent the decline in the minimum wage—that is, the change 
in wage inequality that would have been observed had the minimum wage been held at a 
constant real benchmark. These counterfactuals are constructed using our estimates for how 
the minimum wage affects every percentile of the wage distribution, as described in the 
previous section—as such, they do not distinguish between mechanical and spillover effects of 
the minimum wage, nor do they recover the counterfactual distribution of wages absent the 
minimum wage (since the effective minimum wage measure, equal to the logarithm of the 
minimum minus the logarithm of the median, is undefined at a minimum wage of zero). We 
address both limitations—spillovers and full distribution counterfactuals—in the next section. 
   ∆𝑤𝑠𝑡
𝑝 = 𝗽 ̂
1
𝑝�𝑚 �𝑠,𝜏0 − 𝑚 �𝑠,𝜏1� + 𝗽 ̂
2
𝑝�𝑚 �𝑠,𝜏0
2 − 𝑚 �𝑠,𝜏1
2 �  (9)  
where 𝑚 �𝑠,𝜏1 is the observed end-of period effective minimum in state s in some year 𝜏1, 𝑚 �𝑠,𝜏0 




𝑝  are point 
estimates from the OLS and 2SLS estimates in Table 2 (columns 1, 3, or 4).
17
                                                        
17 So, for example, taking 𝜏0 = 1979 and 𝜏1 = 1988, and subtracting ∆𝑤𝑠𝑡
𝑝 from each observed wage in 1979 
would adjust the 1979 distribution to its counterfactual under the realized effective minima in 1988. 
 We pool these 16 
 
adjusted wage observations to form a counterfactual national wage  distribution, and we 
compare changes in inequality in the simulated distribution to those in the observed 
distribution.
18
Before  implementing equation 
  
(9),  we summarize in Table 4  estimates of the average 
marginal effect of the effective minimum wage on 50-10 inequality by gender for 1979 through 
2009 and several sub-periods. For each gender and time interval, we fit three models: a pooled 
OLS model excluding state dummies (i.e., the primary specification in Lee, 1999); a fixed-effects 
instrumental variables model with state dummies and trends; and a first-difference 
instrumental variables model with state dummies.  
For all 2SLS models, F-tests (not tabulated) indicate that the instruments are jointly highly 
significant and pass standard diagnostic tests for weak instruments (e.g., Stock, Wright and 
Yogo, 2002). Nevertheless, Table 4  finds that 2SLS estimates of the marginal effect of the 
minimum wage on wage inequality are insignificant in many cases when estimated for the focal 
period of 1979 through 1989 studied by Lee (1999).
19
The top panel of Table 5 shows that between 1979 and 1991, the female 50/10 log wage 
ratio increased by 22 log points. Applying the marginal effect estimate obtained using the OLS 
 This lack of statistical significance is not 
surprising in light of the small number of policy changes in this period: between 1979 and 1985, 
only one state adopted a minimum wage in excess of the federal minimum; the eight additional 
adoptions that took take between 1979 and 1988 all occurred between 1986 and 1988 (Table 
1). Consequently, when calculating counterfactuals below, we apply marginal effects estimates 
obtained using additional years of data. By extending the estimation window to 1991 (as was 
also done by Lee, 1999), we exploit the substantial federal minimum wage increase that took 
place between 1990 and 1991. This generated numerous cross-state contrasts since 9 states 
had by 1989 raised their minimums above the 1989 federal level and below the 1991 federal 
level (and an additional three raised their minimum to $4.25, which would be the level of the 
1991 federal minimum wage).  
                                                        
18 Also distinct from Lee, we use states’ observed median wages when calculating 𝑚 � rather than the national 
median deflated by the price index. This choice has no substantive effect on the results, but appears most 
consistent with the identifying assumptions.  
19 In a separate set of tables, Lee also analyzes these relationships for 1989 through 1991.  17 
 
model fit to the female wage data for 1979 through 2009, we calculate that had the minimum 
wage been constant at its real 1991 level throughout this period, female 50/10 inequality would 
counterfactually have risen by only 6 log points. Thus, consistent with Lee (1999), the OLS 
estimate implies that the decline in the real minimum wage can account for the bulk (16 of 22 
log points) of the expansion of lower tail female wage inequality in this period.  
The next two columns of the table present analogous counterfactuals estimated using 2SLS 
models (either fixed effect or first difference) in place of OLS. These estimates  find a 
substantially smaller role for the minimum wage. The fixed-effects IV estimate implies that the 
minimum wage explains roughly half (55 percent) of the rise in female 50/10 inequality in this 
period. The first-difference IV model—which  relies  on the most plausible assumptions—
indicates that the minimum wage explains less than a third (7 of 22 log points) of the rise in the 
female 50/10. These are non-trivial effects, of course, and they confirm, in accordance with the 
visual evidence in Figure 2, that the falling minimum wage contributed meaningfully to rising 
female lower-tail inequality during the 1980s and early 1990s.  
The second and third rows of Table 5 calculate the effect of the minimum wage on male and 
pooled gender inequality. Here, the discrepancy between OLS and IV-based counterfactuals is 
even more pronounced. OLS estimates imply that the minimum wage explains a bit more than 
40 percent of the 11 log point rise in male 50/10 inequality between 1979 and 1991, and more 
than 100 percent of the 7 log point rise in pooled gender inequality in the same interval. By 
contrast, 2SLS models indicate that the minimum wage explains less than 10 percent of the rise 
in male wage inequality and about half of the decline in pooled gender inequality.  
Despite their substantial discrepancy with the OLS models, these 2SLS estimates appear 
highly plausible. Figure 1 shows that the minimum wage was nominally non-binding for males 
throughout the sample period, with fewer than 6 percent of all male wages falling at or below 
the relevant minimum wage in any given year. For the pooled gender distribution, the 
minimum wage had somewhat more bite, with more than 8 percent of all hours paid at or 
below the minimum in the first few years of the sample. But this is modest relative to its 
position in the female distribution, where 9 to 13 percent of wages were at or below the 
relevant minimum in the first five years of the sample. Consistent with these facts, 2SLS 18 
 
estimates indicate that the falling minimum wage generated a sizable increase in female wage 
inequality, a modest increase in pooled gender inequality, and a minimal increase in male wage 
inequality.  
Subsequent panels of Table 5 calculate counterfactual (minimum wage constant) changes in 
inequality over several other time intervals of interest (1979-1988, 1979-2009, and 1998-2009). 
In all cases, the contribution of the minimum wage to rising inequality is smaller when 
estimated using 2SLS in place of OLS models.  
Figure 6 and the top panel of Figure 7 provide a visual comparison of observed and 
counterfactual changes in male, female and pooled-gender wage inequality during the critical 
period of 1979 through 1988, during which time the minimum wage remained nominally fixed 
while lower-tail inequality rose rapidly for all groups. As per Lee (1999), the OLS counterfactuals 
depicted in these plots suggest that the minimum wage explains essentially all of the 23.4, 7.7 
and 10.8 log point rise in 50/10 inequality in the female, male and pooled-gender distributions 
during this period. The 2SLS counterfactuals place this contribution at a far more modest level. 
For example, the counterfactual series for males is indistinguishable from the observed series, 
implying that the minimum wage made almost no contribution to the rise in male inequality in 
this period. The lower panel of Figure 7, which plots observed and counterfactual wages change 
in the pooled gender distribution for the full sample period of 1979 through 2009 (again holding 
the minimum wage at its 1988 value), shows a similarly pronounced discrepancy between OLS 
and 2SLS models.  
As a robustness test, panel 2 of Table 5 repeats these counterfactual calculations using 
marginal effects estimates from years 1979 through 1991 (used by Lee) rather than the full 
sample period. The counterfactual estimates in this table are highly consistent with those 
calculated earlier, both during the critical period of 1979 through 1991 and during other sub- 
and super-intervals.  These estimates consistently find a considerably smaller role for the 
minimum wage in rise of U.S. inequality than prior work has suggested. While they do not 
qualitatively reverse the view that the falling minimum wage contributed to the growth of 
lower tail inequality during the 1980s, they suggest a quantitatively large downward revision to 
the estimated magnitude of this contribution.   19 
 
IV.  Decomposing the direct and spillover effects of the minimum wage 
As highlighted in Figure 1, federal and state minimum wages were nominally non-binding at 
the 10
th percentile of the wage distribution throughout most of the sample; in fact, there is only 
one three year interval (1979 to 1982), when more than ten percent of hours paid were at or 
below the minimum wage—and this was only the case for females. Yet our main estimates 
imply that the minimum wage modestly compressed both male and pooled-gender 50/10 wage 
inequality during the 1980s. This implies that the minimum wage had spillover effects onto 
percentiles above where it binds. To better understand these spillovers, we now estimate the 
separate contributions of direct and spillover effects of the minimum wage to the overall wage 
distribution.   
To guide thinking, we begin by writing down a simple statistical model of spillovers. Denote 
by 𝑤(𝑝)𝑠𝑡
∗  the log wage for the p
th percentile in state s at time t if there was no minimum 
wage—call this the latent wage percentile. If there is a binding minimum wage, which we 
denote in log form as 𝑤𝑠𝑡
𝑚, the actual log wage at percentile p, denoted by 𝑤(𝑝)𝑠𝑡
∗ , will deviate 
from the latent distribution for at least some percentiles. If the minimum wage had no effect on 
employment rates and no spillovers to percentiles above where it directly binds, we would 
have: 
    𝑤𝑠𝑡(𝑝) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥[𝑤𝑠𝑡
∗ (𝑝),𝑤𝑠𝑡
𝑚]  (10)   
If there are spillovers or disemployment effects, however, the minimum wage will also have an 
effect on percentiles above where it binds (see Teulings  2000, for an explicit supply and 
demand model with this feature). Generalizing (10) to allow for this possibility, we have: 
    𝑤𝑠𝑡(𝑝) = 𝜙[𝑤𝑠𝑡
∗ (𝑝),𝑤𝑠𝑡
𝑚]  (11)   
We expect the function 𝜙[⋅,⋅]  to be increasing  in both its arguments and to satisfy a 
homogeneity property: if the latent percentile and the minimum wage both rise in the same 
proportion, the actual percentile should rise in that proportion. Since the model is expressed in 
logs, this restriction can be written as: 
    𝜙[𝑤𝑠𝑡
∗ (𝑝) + 𝑎,𝑤𝑠𝑡
𝑚 + 𝑎] = 𝑎 + 𝜙[𝑤𝑠𝑡
∗ (𝑝),𝑤𝑠𝑡
𝑚].  (12)   
Setting 𝑎 = −𝑤𝑠𝑡
∗ (𝑝) and applying (12) to (11), we have that:  20 
 
    𝑤𝑠𝑡(𝑝) = 𝑤𝑠𝑡
∗ (𝑝) + 𝜙[0,𝑤𝑠𝑡
𝑚 − 𝑤𝑠𝑡
∗ (𝑝)] = 𝑤𝑠𝑡
∗ (𝑝) + 𝜓�𝑤𝑠𝑡
𝑚 − 𝑤𝑠𝑡
∗ (𝑝)�.  (13)   
The observed percentile will depend upon both the latent percentile and the gap between the 
minimum and the latent percentile, 𝜓�𝑤𝑠𝑡
𝑚 − 𝑤𝑠𝑡
∗ (𝑝)�. 
Logic dictates four restrictions on the shape of 𝜓(⋅)  that place significant economic 
structure on this function. First, 𝜓(⋅) should be at least weakly positive everywhere—if not, the 
minimum wage would reduce wages at some percentiles.
20
Graphically, these four restrictions imply a function akin to the one depicted in Figure 8, 
which plots a set of hypothetical deviations between observed and latent percentiles of the 
wage distribution. The x-axis in this figure corresponds to the gap between the minimum wage 
and the latent value of percentile p (which may be positive or negative), while the y-axis plots 
both the observed and latent values of percentile p. If spillovers are present, our assumptions 
imply that they will be largest at the location where the minimum wage exactly equals the 
latent wage value (the point labeled “0” in the figure).
 We further expect 𝜓(⋅) to have a 
positive first derivative, so the observed percentile is increasing as  the gap between the 
statutory minimum and the latent wage percentile becomes more positive (or less negative). 
Naturally, if the minimum wage is very low or non-existent, we expect the observed percentile 
to be close to the latent percentile, implying that 𝜓(−∞) = 0. Finally, if the minimum wage is 
high relative to the latent wage percentile, we expect the observed percentile to be very close 
to the minimum wage, so that lim𝑥→∞ 𝜓(𝑥) = 𝑥. This last assumption simply says that if the 
minimum wage lies far above the latent wage at a given percentile, its primary effect will be to 
raise that percentile to the level of the minimum wage, not beyond it.   
21
                                                        
20 It is conceivable (though in our view unlikely) that a binding minimum wage could reduce wages in the upper 
reaches of the wage distribution if, for example, the minimum wage redistributed rents from high to low wage 
workers. Our analysis here concerns the shape of the wage distribution at or below the median.  
 The magnitude of spillovers is expected 
to attenuate in either direction from this point: further down the latent wage distribution, the 
minimum becomes extremely binding and so the mechanical effect dominates; further up the 
latent distribution, the minimum wage becomes less and less relevant.  
21 Because the minimum is non-binding at this location, any effect on the observed percentile is by definition a 
spillover. 21 
 
A.  Parametric estimation 
If we knew with certainty the shape of the latent wage distribution, calculating spillovers 
would be straightforward. Let Δ𝑤𝑠𝑡
𝑇(𝑝) equal the gap between the latent and observed wage 
percentile p in state s at time t. This is the total
   
 effect (direct and spillover) of the minimum 
wage at percentile p: 
Δ𝑤𝑠𝑡
𝑇(𝑝) ≡ 𝑤𝑠𝑡(𝑝) − 𝑤𝑠𝑡
∗ (𝑝)  (14)   




𝑆 (𝑝). The direct effect is simply equal to the maximum of the minimum wage 
minus the latent percentile and zero: 
    Δ𝑤𝑠𝑡
𝐷(𝑝) ≡ max[𝑤𝑠𝑡
𝑚 − 𝑤𝑠𝑡
∗ (𝑝),0].  (15)   
And the spillover is the difference between (14) and (15): Δ𝑤𝑠𝑡
𝑆 (𝑝) = Δ𝑤𝑠𝑡
𝑇(𝑝) − Δ𝑤𝑠𝑡
𝐷(𝑝). 
Implementing this decomposition requires three quantities: the statutory minimum wage, 
the observed wage at each percentile, and the latent wage at each percentile. The first two 
items are readily available, while the third must be estimated. This estimation requires a more 
parametric approach than applied above because we must approximate latent percentiles that 
are essentially never observed in the data (i.e., because they are always below the minimum).  
The parametric approach that we use is to assume that the latent log wage distribution is 
normal; that is, we use the model in equation (2) with 𝐹(⋅) having the standard normal form. 
We estimate the parameters of this distribution using observed wages between the 50
th and 
75
th percentiles of state wage distributions, a portion of the wage distribution where we expect 
the minimum to have no effect. We model both 𝜇𝑠𝑡 and 𝜎𝑠𝑡 in (2) as additive year and state 
dummies plus state level trends—so, we allow both the mean and variance to vary across states 
and time.
22
                                                        
22 Specifically, we estimate 𝜇𝑠𝑡and 𝜎𝑠𝑡 by pooling the 50
th through 75
th log wage percentiles, regressing the log 
value of the percentile on the inverse CDF of the standard normal distribution, and allowing the intercept (𝜇𝑠𝑡) and 
coefficient (𝜎𝑠𝑡) to vary by state and year (and including state-specific time trends in both the intercept and 
coefficient). This procedure assumes that the wage distribution is unaffected by the minimum wage between the 
50th and 75th percentiles; hence, the distribution between the 50th and 75th percentiles, combined with our 
 Armed with these parameter estimates, we can invert the standard normal to 
obtain the implied latent wage distribution for all percentiles.  22 
 
Though this approach relies on somewhat strong parametric assumptions, a key strength is 
that its sources of identifying variation are almost entirely distinct from those used in the 
reduced form model above. In particular, estimation of the parametric model uses exclusively 
variation in the 50
th  through 75
th  percentiles of state wage distributions and uses no 
information whatsoever about the statutory minimum wage. That is, because we estimate the 
minimum wage’s total impact simply by taking the difference between observed and estimated 
latent wage percentiles, the actual minimum wage does not enter into this calculation.
23
We begin by comparing the fit of the parametric model to the data. This fit is depicted in 
Figure 9, which plots the average deviation across states and years between the observed wage 
percentile and the estimated latent percentile for percentiles 3 through 75.
 
Consequently, this combination of approaches, reduced form and parametric, may speak to the 
plausibility of both set of estimates.  
24 These estimates 
are performed and plotted separately for both sexes and for the pooled distribution. While the 
average residual must be zero by construction over the range of percentiles 50 through 75 
(reflecting the OLS fit of the model to these percentiles), the in-sample fit is nevertheless 
informative.  If the assumption of log  normality  were violated,  we would see systematic 
deviations between the residuals with the wage percentiles. These deviations are very close to 
zero for all three samples, however, suggesting that the normality assumption is a good one. 
Though not visible in the figure, the model also performs well when extrapolated out of sample 
to  upper-tail  percentiles 76 through 90.
25
                                                                                                                                                                                   
parametric assumptions, allows us to infer the shape of the wage distribution for lower percentiles. We have 
experimented with the percentiles used to estimate the latent wage distribution and the results are not very 
sensitive to the choices made. 
  These specification checks suggest  that the log 
normality assumption is a reasonable one for the portions of the wage distribution in which we 
do not expect the minimum wage to affect its shape.  
23  The subsequent decomposition into direct and spillover effects does, of course, require knowledge of the 
statutory minimum.  
24 The lowest percentiles are excluded because these are typically below the minimum wage which would imply 
negative spillover effects.  In the subsequent section, we consider the interpretation of these reported 
subminimum wages.  
25 As is well-known, the very highest percentiles are not well-approximated by a normal distribution (the Pareto 
distribution is a better fit)—thus, the actual observed percentiles are well above the predicted latent percentiles. 
Our modeling exercise is only applied to obtaining counterfactual values of lower-tail percentiles.  23 
 
We now turn our attention to the portion of the distribution where we expect the minimum 
wage to have an impact. Figure 9 shows that the deviations between observed and estimated 
latent wages are substantial and positive for lower percentiles. At the 10
th percentile of the 
wage distribution, this deviation is equal to 2, 14 and 10 log points for males, females and the 
pooled distribution respectively. These patterns are consistent with the minimum wage raising 
observed wages above their latent levels, as was earlier found by the reduced form analysis. 
Moreover, the fact that the deviations between observed and estimated latent percentiles are 
larger and occur higher in the distribution for females and for the pooled distributions than for 
males is consistent with minimum wage playing only a modest role in shaping male wages. 
There is also some indication that the normality assumption over-predicts observed male wages 
in the 15
th-50
th percentile range, but the absolute magnitude of the deviation is small (never 
exceeding 2 log points). 
How much of the deviation between observed and estimated latent percentiles found in 
Figure 9 is due to direct versus spillover effects of the minimum wage? We assess this question 
using the parameter estimates underlying figure 9 and the decomposition in equations (14) and 
(15). For each state and year, we first calculate the estimated magnitudes of direct and spillover 
effects at each wage percentile.  We then use the mapping between state-year percentiles and 
aggregate annual percentiles to estimate the direct and spillover effects of the minimum wage 
to each percentile of the aggregate male, female and pooled wage distributions in each year.
26
Figure 10 plots the estimated direct, spillover and total effects of the minimum wage on log 
50/10 wage inequality by gender and overall for each year from 1979 through 2009.
  
27
                                                        
26 More precisely, our procedure is as follows.  First, we calculate the total, direct, and spillover effects for each 
percentile in each state-year as described in footnote 22.  Next, for each state/year/percentile, we calculate the 
average total effect for each value of log(min)-log(p) (rounded to two decimals), where the average is weighted by 
the sum of individual weights for the given state-year; the direct effect is the maximum of 0 and log(min)-log(p), 
and the spillover effect is the difference between the total and direct effects.  Thus, state/year/percentiles with 
the same rounded value of log(min)-log(p) will have the same total, direct, and spillover effects.  To aggregate this 
to the national level, we calculate each individual’s percentile in their state/year wage distribution, merge in these 
estimated minimum wage effects, and average the minimum wage effects by year/percentile.   
 The total 
impact of the minimum wage is very large at the start of the sample period for the female 
27 Because the minimum wage is estimated to have virtually no effect on the median (that is, the gap between the 
observed and latent median), the results in Figure 10 derive almost entirely from the compressing effect of the 
minimum wage at the 10
th percentile. 24 
 
distribution, equal to 19 log points. Almost the entirety of this impact is a direct effect of the 
minimum wage, which is consistent with our hypothesis  that  the minimum’s direct effects 
should  dominate its spillover effects when the minimum is very binding.
28  This  pattern  is 
further borne out in the period between 1980 and 1988, when the real value of the minimum 
wage rapidly eroded. We find that the total effect of the minimum on female 50/10 inequality 
fell from 19 to 9 log points in this time period, while the spillover rose from 1 to 8 log points. 
Thus, as the bindingness of the minimum wage ‘unwound’ its spillover effects became 
quantitatively more important than its direct effects. The impact of the subsequent hikes in the 
minimum wage between 1989 and 2009 are all clearly visible in the figure. Interestingly, each of 
these hikes appears to have a direct
Subsequent panels in  the figure repeat this exercise for males and for the pooled 
distribution. These results tell a similar story to that for females, but the magnitudes differ 
greatly. For the pooled distribution, the maximal impact of the minimum wage on 50/10 
inequality declines from 15 to approximately 7 log points between 1979 and 1988, while the 
spillover component fluctuates between 5 and 7 log points throughout all three decades. For 
males, the minimum wage has almost no 
 effect on wage inequality but little initial spillover effect. 
Spillovers, in turn, become more significant as the direct effect is eroded by inflation.  
direct effect on 50/10 wage gap, consistent with the 
fact that it is almost never binding at the aggregate 10
th percentile. Nonetheless, the total
How closely do the structural estimates of the minimum wage’s total effect align with the 
reduced form estimates above? Figure 11 explores this question. Because the reduced form 
estimates cannot be used to infer the level of inequality that would prevail if there were 
 
effect of the minimum wage on male inequality is non-zero in most years and, moreover, 
clearly follows the vicissitudes of the real minimum wage. By implication, the minimum wage 
modestly compresses  male 50/10 inequality  primarily  through spillovers. This noteworthy 
pattern is logical: since the minimum wage directly binds below the 10
th percentile of males 




                                                        
28 This assumption is not imposed by our estimation, however.  
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minimum wage (since this would require taking the logarithm of zero), we instead use the 
reduced form estimates (based on the 2SLS first-differenced specification) to calculate the 
latent log 50/10 wage gap in each year 1979 through 2009 while holding the real minimum 
wage at its 1988 level (i.e., the low point). We then calculate the change in this measure 
relative to its 1979 level.  Figure 11 compares the reduced form estimates of the change in 
latent 50/10 with the structural estimates of this quantity.
29
The correspondence between the 2SLS reduced-form and structural estimates is reasonably 
tight. The structural estimates imply that latent female inequality increased by 10 log points 
between 1979 and 1988, whereas the 2SLS estimates imply an increase of 15 log points and OLS 
estimates imply an increase of 3 log points; as the actual increase was 23 log points, these 
suggest that the decline in the minimum wage could explain between 35% (reduced-form) and 
57% (structural) of the increase in 50/10 inequality over this period.  Consistent with table 5, 
OLS estimates imply a much greater contribution of the minimum wage (87%).  Similar 
calculations  for the male and pooled gender distributions  imply  that the decline in the 
minimum wage could explain 1.2 (reduced-form) to 4.5 (structural) log points of the 7.7 log 
point increase for males, and 3.8 (reduced-form) to 6.8 (structural) log points of the 10.8 log 
point increase for the pooled distribution.  Over the years of our sample, the structural 
estimates generally imply a larger contribution of the minimum wage than do the reduced-form 
estimates, though both are always smaller than the OLS counterfactual changes.  
 
V.  Distinguishing true spillovers from measurement error: the limits of inference 
We have so far interpreted the measured effect of the minimum wage on the earnings of 
above minimum wage workers as a spillover. A mundane but nonetheless plausible alternative 
explanation for this finding is measurement error. To see why, suppose that a subset of workers 
who are paid the minimum wage report wage values that are modestly above or below the true 
minimum—that is, they report with error. Moreover, suppose that the central tendency of this 
reporting error moves in tandem with the minimum wage; when the minimum wage rises or 
                                                        
29 Although the structural estimates correspond to a case with no minimum wage whatsoever, this is fairly close to 
reality in 1988.  26 
 
falls, the measurement error cloud moves with it. Under these assumptions, the presence of 
measurement error may create the appearance of spillovers where none are present.  
For example, consider a case where the minimum wage is set at the 5
th percentile of the 
latent wage distribution and has no spillover effects. However, due to misreporting, the spike in 
the wage distribution at the true minimum wage is surrounded by a measurement error cloud 
that extends from the 1
st through the 9
th percentiles. If the legislated minimum wage were to 
rise to the 9
th  percentile and measurement error were to remain constant, the rise in the 
minimum wage would compress the measured wage distribution up to the 13
th percentile (thus, 
reducing the measured 50/10 wage gap). Yet, the rise in the minimum wage would have had no 
impact on the actual 50/10 gap; the apparent spillover would be due to measurement error 
spillovers to nearby percentiles.
30
Our structural exercise above cannot unfortunately distinguish between these two possible 
explanations for spillovers  (measurement error versus true spillovers) since both imply 
systematic deviations between observed and estimated latent wage percentiles 
 This raises the question of whether the spillovers from the 
minimum wage to the measured wage distribution (Figures 9 and 10) overstate the size of 
spillovers to the actual wage distribution.  
above
We use a simple measurement error model to test this hypothesis. Denote by 𝑝∗ a latent 
percentile of the wage distribution (i.e. the percentile absent measurement error), and write 
the latent wage associated with it as 𝑤∗(𝑝∗). Assuming that there are only direct effects of the 
minimum wage (i.e., no true spillovers and no disemployment effects), then the true wage at 
percentile 𝑝∗ will be given by: 
  the 
location where the minimum binds. In this final section of the paper, we quantify the possible 
bias wrought by these measurement spillovers. Specifically, we ask whether we can reject the 
null hypothesis that the minimum wage only affects the earnings of those at or below the 
minimum (in which case, the apparent spillovers would be consistent with measurement error).   
    𝑤(𝑝∗) ≡ max[𝑤𝑚,𝑤∗(𝑝)],  (16)   
                                                        
30 This argument holds in reverse for a decline in the minimum: a fall in the minimum from the 9
th to the 6
th 
percentile may reduce measured 50/10 wage inequality even if there is no impact on actual 50/10 wage inequality.  27 
 
where 𝑤∗(𝑝) is the true latent log wage percentile. Denote by 𝑝̂(𝑤𝑚) the true percentile at 
which the minimum wage binds. Then:  
    𝑤∗�𝑝̂(𝑤𝑚)� = 𝑤𝑚.  (17)   
Now, allow for the possibility of measurement error, so that for a worker  at true wage 
percentile 𝑝∗, we observe: 
    𝑤𝑖 = 𝑤(𝑝∗) + 𝜀𝑖,  (18)   
where 𝜀𝑖 is an error term with density function 𝑔(𝜀), which we assume to be independent of 
the true wage. The density of wages among workers whose true percentile is 𝑝∗ is therefore 
given by 𝑔�𝑤 − 𝑤(𝑝∗)�. The density of observed wages is simply the average of 𝑔(⋅) across 
true percentiles: 
   
𝑓(𝑤) = � 𝑔�𝑤 − 𝑤(𝑝∗)�𝑑𝑝∗
1
0
.  (19)   
And the cumulative density function for observed wages is given by: 
   





.  (20)   
This can be inverted to give an implicit equation for the wage at observed percentile 𝑝, 𝑤(𝑝): 
   





.  (21)   
By differentiating this expression with respect to the minimum wage, 
𝜕𝑤(𝑝)
𝜕𝑤𝑚 , we obtain the 
following key result (with details given in the Appendix): 
Result 1:
The intuition for this result is straightforward: if changes in the minimum wage only affect the 
wages of those directly affected, then the wage at an observed percentile can only change to 
the extent that some of those workers are truly paid the minimum wage. Thus, if the minimum 
 Under the null hypothesis of no true spillovers, the elasticity of wages at an 
observed percentile with respect to the minimum wage is equal to the fraction of 
people at that observed percentile whose true wage is equal to the minimum. 28 
 
wage rises by 1 percent, and 10 percent of workers at a given percentile are paid the minimum 
wage, the observed wage percentile will rise by 0.1 percent.  
This result has a simple corollary (also proved in the appendix) that we use in the estimation 
below: 
Result 2: Under the null hypothesis of no true spillovers, the elasticity of the overall
This result follows from the fact that all individuals who are truly paid the minimum wage must 
appear 
 
mean log wage with respect to the minimum wage is equal to the fraction of the wage 
distribution that is truly paid the minimum wage—that is, the size of the true spike. 
somewhere in the observed wage distribution. And of course, changes at any point in 
the distribution also change the mean. Thus, if the true spike at the minimum wage comprises 
10 percent of the mass of the wage distribution, a 1 percent rise in the minimum will increase 
the actual and observed
The practical value of Result 2 is that we can readily estimate the effect of changes in the 
minimum wage on the mean using the methods developed above. Under the null hypothesis of 
no spillovers, Result 2 tells us that the effect of the minimum wage on the mean wage effect 
will be equal to the size of the ‘true’ spike. If the null hypothesis is false, however, we would 
expect the elasticity to 
 mean wage by 1 percent. Note that no distributional assumptions 
about measurement error are needed for either Result 1 or Result 2, other than the assumption 
that the measurement error distribution is independent of wage levels and symmetric around 
any given location. 
exceed
In practice, we estimate a first-differenced form of equation (4) using as the dependent 
variable the deviation between the state’s mean log wage its and median log wage (to remain 
analogous to our previous estimation strategy). The dashed  and  dotted  lines in Figure 12 
represent the marginal effect on the mean by year, taking the weighted average across all 
states for each year. Under the null hypothesis of no true spillovers, these estimates of the 
effect of changes in the minimum on changes in the mean are an estimate of the size of the 
true spike. Under the alternative hypothesis that true spillovers are present, these marginal 
 the size of the true spike since a subset of workers whose wages 
exceed the minimum wage will also have their wages increased by the minimum. 29 
 
effects on the mean will exceed the size of the true spike. To distinguish these alternatives 
requires a second, independent estimate of the size of the true spike.  
B.  Estimating measurement error 
We develop a second estimate of the magnitude of the true spike by directly estimating 
measurement error in wage reporting and then using this estimate to infer the size of the spike 
absent this error. We exploit the fact that under the assumption of full compliance with the 
minimum wage, all observations found below the minimum wage must be observations with 
measurement error.
31  Of course, wage observations below the minimum can only provide 
information on individuals with negative
In what follows, we use maximum likelihood to estimate the distribution of wages below 
the minimum and the fraction of workers at and above the minimum. We assume that the 
‘true’ wage distribution only has a mass point at the minimum wage so that 𝑤∗(𝑝∗) has a 
continuous derivative. We also assume that the measurement error distribution only has a 
mass point at zero so that there is a non-zero probability of observing the ‘true’ wage (without 
this assumption, we would be unable to rationalize the existence of a spike in the observed 
wage distribution at the minimum wage.) Denote the probability that the wage is correctly 
reported as 𝗾. For those who report an error-ridden wage, we will use, in a slight departure 
from previous notation, 𝑔(𝜀) to denote the distribution of the error. 
 measurement error, since minimum wage earners 
with positive measurement error must have an observed wage above the minimum. Thus, a key 
identifying assumption is that that the measurement error is symmetric, that is 𝑔(𝜀) = 𝑔(−𝜀).   
                                                        
31  Of course there are likely to be some individuals who correctly report sub-minimum wage wages.  One 
potentially large occupation class is tipped workers, who in many states can legally receive a sub-minimum hourly 
wage as long as tips push their total hourly income above the minimum. For instance, in 2009, about 55 percent of 
those who reported their primary occupation as waiter or waitress reported an hourly wage less than the 
applicable minimum wage for their state, and about 17 percent of all observed sub-minimum wages were from 
waiters and waitresses. If we treat the wages of these individuals as measurement error, we will clearly over-state 
the extent of misreporting. We circumvent this problem by conducting the measurement/spillover analysis on a 
sample that excludes employees in low-paying occupations that commonly receive tips or commission. These are: 
food service jobs, barbers and hairdressers, retail salespersons and telemarketers.  30 
 
With these assumptions, the size of the spike in the observed
   
 wage distribution at the 
minimum wage, which we denote by, 𝑝 �, is equal to the true spike times the probability that the 
wage is correctly reported: 
𝑝 � = 𝗾𝑝̂.  (22)   
Hence, using an estimate of 𝗾, we can estimate the magnitude of the true spike as 𝑝̂ ≈ 𝑝 �/𝗾 �.
32
To estimate 𝗾, we use observations on the fraction of workers paid strictly below the 
minimum, which we denote by 𝑍. Assuming full compliance with the minimum wage statute, all 
of these subminimum wages will represent negative measurement error.  We therefore have: 
 
   
𝑍 = (1 − 𝗾) × �0.5𝑝̂ + � 𝐺�𝑤𝑚 − 𝑤∗(𝑝∗)�𝑑𝑝∗
1
𝑝 �
�  (23)   
The symmetry assumption implies that half of those at the true spike who report wages with 
error  will  report wages below the minimum, and this is reflected as the first term in the 
bracketed expression (0.5𝑝̂). In addition, for workers paid above the minimum, some subset 
will report with sufficiently negative error that their reported wage will fall below the minimum, 
thus also contributing to the mass below the statutory minimum. This  contributor to 𝑍  is 
captured by the second term in the bracketed expression. 
C.  Finding: Spillovers cannot be distinguished from measurement error 
Under the assumptions used above that the true latent log wage distribution is normal with 
mean 𝜇 and variance 𝜎𝑤
2 and that the measurement error distribution is normal with mean 0 
variance 𝜎𝜀
2, our estimation proceeds in two steps. First, we use observations on the top part of 
the wage distribution to estimate the median and variance of the observed latent wage 
distribution, allowing for variation across state and time (identical to the model used in Section 
IV). Next, we estimate (𝜎𝜀
2, 𝗾) by maximum likelihood. We assume that (𝜎𝜀
2, 𝗾) vary over time 
but not across states (with further details found in the Appendix). As previously noted, we 
                                                        
32 One might wonder why none of those observed in the spike are ‘errors’, individuals who are not paid the 
minimum but, by chance, have an error which makes them appeared to be paid the minimum.  But, the 
assumption on the absence of mass points in the true wage distribution and the error distribution mean that this 
group is of measure zero so can be ignored.   31 
 
perform this analysis on a sample that excludes individuals from lower-paying occupations that 
tend to earn tips or commission. 
Estimates of 𝗾 for males, females, and the pooled sample (not shown) generally find that 
the probability of correct reporting is around 80 percent, and mostly varies from between 80 to 
90 percent over time (though is estimated to be around 70 percent in the early 1980s). We 
combine this estimate with the observed spike to get an estimate of the ‘true’ spike in each 
period, though this will be an estimate of the true size of the spike only for the estimation 
sample (workers in non-tipped occupations).   
This leaves us in need of an estimate of the ‘true’ spike for the tipped occupations. Given 
the complexity of the state laws surrounding the minimum wage for tipped employees, we do 
not attempt to model these subminimum wages. Rather we simply note that the spike for 
tipped employees must be between zero and one, and we use this observation to bound the 
‘true’ spike for the whole workforce. Because the fraction of workers in tipped occupations is 
relatively small, these bounds are relatively narrow. 
Figure 12 compares these bounds with the earlier estimates of the ‘true’ spike based on the 
elasticity of the mean with respect to the minimum in each year. Under the null hypothesis that 
the minimum wage has no true spillovers, the effect on the mean should equal the size of the 
‘true’ spike.  And indeed, the estimated mean effect lies within the bounds of the estimated 
‘true’ spike in almost all years. We are accordingly unable to reject the hypothesis that the 
apparent effect of the minimum wage on percentiles above the minimum is a measurement 
error spillover rather than a true spillover. 
If we tentatively accept this null, it has an important implication for our findings. Table 1 
shows that there is only one time period in our sample window when more than 10 percent of 
the hourly wages were paid above the statutory minimum. This period is 1979 to 1982, and the 
criterion is only met for females. For males and for the pooled-gender distribution, the 
minimum wage never covers more than 9 percent of the distribution.
33
                                                        
33 More precisely, the relevant comparison is the fraction of hours paid below the minimum in the true wage 
distribution (purged of measurement error) rather than the fraction in the error-ridden distribution. Given that the 
minimum lies in the left-hand tail of the distribution, that the assumed error distribution is additive, and that the 
  Under the null 32 
 
hypothesis of no spillovers, we would have to conclude that the minimum wage had no effect 
on the actual male and pooled-gender wage distributions throughout the sample period, and 
ceased having an effect on the female wage distribution after 1982. Thus, any changes in the 
actual (rather than the measured) 10/50 differential after 1983 could not be accounted for by 
the minimum wage.  
Two points deserve emphasis. First, even accepting the null of no spillovers, our estimates 
for the effect of the minimum wage on observed
Second, our findings do not exclude the possibility of true spillovers—and indeed, we 
suspect these spillovers are present. Our results do, however, highlight that we do not have 
sufficient precision to distinguish actual spillovers  from measurement error spillovers in 
currently available data. Better wage data, perhaps administrative payroll data, may be more 
conclusive. 
 wage inequality (both direct and spillover 
effects) in the prior sections are valid. However, observed and actual wage effects may differ 
systematically in a manner that overstates the role of the minimum wage. And clearly, 
spillovers from the legislated minimum to wages actually paid are of greater economic 
consequence than spillovers to wages that are (mis-)reported.  
VI.  Conclusion 
This paper offers a reassessment of the impact of the minimum wage on the wage 
distribution by using a longer panel than was available to previous studies, incorporating many 
additional years of data and including significantly more variation in state minimum wages, and 
using an econometric approach that purges division bias and confounding correlations between 
state wage levels and wage variances that we find bias earlier estimates. We estimate that 35-
55% of the growth of lower tail inequality in the female wage distribution between 1979 and 
1988, 35% to 45% of the growth of pooled gender inequality, and approximately 15% of the 
growth of male inequality—as measured by the differential between the log of the 50
th and 10
th 
percentiles—is attributable to the decline in the real value of the minimum wage. Similarly, 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
statutory minimum is known without error, the fraction of hours below the minimum in the error-ridden 
distribution strictly overestimates the fraction of hours below the minimum in the true wage distribution.  33 
 
calculations indicate that the declining minimum wage made only a modest contribution to 
growing lower tail inequality between 1988 and 2009 as well. In net, these estimates indicate a 
substantially smaller role for the U.S. minimum in the rise of inequality than suggested by 
earlier work (which attributed 85% to 110% of this rise to the falling minimum). 
Despite these modest total effects, we estimate minimum wage effects that extend further 
up the wage distribution than would be predicted if the minimum wage had a purely 
mechanical effect on wages (i.e., raising the wage of all who earned below it). We estimate the 
shape of the latent distribution with a simple structural estimation technique (by assuming log 
normality and estimating the mean and variance of the state-year wage distribution using 50
th 
to 75
th wage percentiles), and use this to separately infer the direct impact and spillover effects 
from changes in the minimum wage. While the contribution of direct and spillover effects vary 
across percentiles, and over the years, spillover effects account for a modest fraction of the 
minimum wage effect in 1979, and almost the entirety of the effect in 1988.  
One interpretation of these significant spillover effects is that they represent a true wage 
response for workers initially earning above the minimum. An alternative explanation is that 
wages for low-wage workers are mismeasured or misreported. If a significant share of 
minimum wage earners report wages in excess of the minimum wage, and this measurement 
error persists in response to changes in the minimum, then we would observe changes in 
percentiles above where the minimum wage directly binds in response to changes in the 
minimum wage.  Our exercise in Section V is unable to reject the null hypothesis that all of the 
apparent effect of the minimum wage on percentiles above the minimum is the consequence of 
measurement error.  Accepting this null, the implied effect of the minimum wage on the actual 
wage distribution is even smaller than the effect of the minimum wage on the measured wage 
distribution. 
In net, this analysis suggests that there was significant expansion in latent lower tail 
inequality over the 1980s, mirroring the expansion of inequality in the upper tail. While the 
minimum wage was certainly a contributing factor to widening lower tail inequality—
particularly for females—it was not the primary one.   34 
 
VII. Appendix 
A.  Correlation between the Trimmed Mean and the Median 
Here, we derive the correlation coefficient between the median and a trimmed mean under 
the assumption that log wages are normally distributed and that we are drawing samples of 
size N from an underlying identical population.  As in the main text, denote by  ( ) wp the log 
wage at percentile p. 
A standard result (not dependent on a normality assumption) is that the covariance 




, 𝑝1 ≤  𝑝2 
(A.1) 
Where 𝑓(⋅) is the density function.  If  12 pp = , this gives the variance of the wage at a particular 





The trimmed mean between the 30
th and 70
































The formulae in (A.2), (A.4) and (A.5) can be used to compute the correlation coefficient 
between the median and trimmed mean.  Note that this correlation does not depend on the 
sample size N.  If the distribution is normal with mean 𝜇 and variance 𝜎2 then the formula for 











2[Φ−1(p2)]2 , 𝑝1 ≤  𝑝2 
(A.6) 
Where Φ−1(p)  is the inverse of the standard normal cumulative density function.  The variance 






Note that the correlation coefficient between the median and trimmed mean will, given the 
normality assumption, not depend on either 𝜇 or 𝜎2. 
 
B. Proof of Result 1: 
Differentiate (20) to give: 














Now we have that:  
𝜕𝑔[𝑥 − 𝑤(𝑝∗)]




Which, from (15) is:  
𝜕𝑔[𝑥 − 𝑤(𝑝∗)]
𝜕𝑤𝑚 =
−𝑔[𝑥 − 𝑤𝑚] 𝑖𝑓   𝑝∗ ≤ 𝑝̂(𝑤𝑚)
0 𝑖𝑓  𝑝∗ > 𝑝̂(𝑤𝑚) 
 
(A.10) 







The numerator is the fraction of workers who are really paid the minimum wage but are 
observed with wage  𝑤(𝑝)  because they have measurement error equal to [𝑤(𝑝) − 𝑤𝑚].  
Hence the numerator divided by the denominator is the fraction of workers observed at wage 
 𝑤(𝑝) who are really paid the minimum wage. 
   36 
 
C. Proof of Result 2 
One implication of (A.11) is the following.  Suppose we are interested in the effect of minimum 













Change the variable of integration to 𝑤(𝑝).  We will have: 





Hence (A.12) becomes:  
𝜕𝑤 �





That is, the elasticity of average log wages with respect to the log minimum is just the size of 
the true spike. 37 
 
D. Estimation Procedure for the Measurement Error Model 
Our assumption is that the true latent log wage is normally distributed according to: 
𝑤∗~𝑁(𝜇,𝜎𝑤
2)  (A.15) 
To keep notation to a minimum we suppress variation across states and time, though this is 
incorporated into the estimation.  The actual true wage is given by: 
w=max(𝑤𝑚,𝑤∗)  (A.16) 
And the observed wage is given by: 
𝑣=𝑤+𝐷ε  (A.17) 
 
Where D is a binary variable taking the value 0 if the true wage is observed and 1 if it is not.  We 
assume that: 
Pr(𝐷=1)=1-γ  (A.18) 






We choose to parameterize the variance of the error process as proportional to the variance of 
the true latent wage distribution as this will be convenient later.  We later show that  𝜌 is the 
correlation coefficient between the true latent wage and the observed latent wage when mis-
reported—a lower value of 𝜌  is more measurement error so leads to a lower correlation 
between the true and observed wage.  We assume that (𝑤∗,𝐷,𝜀) are all mutually independent.  
Our estimation procedure uses maximum likelihood to estimate the parameters of the 
measurement error model.  There are three types of entries in the likelihood function: 
a.  those with an observed wage equal to the minimum wage 
b.  those with an observed wage above the minimum wage 
c.  those with an observed wage below the minimum wage 
Let us consider the contribution to the likelihood function for these three groups in turn. 38 
 
 
a.  Those Paid the Minimum Wage 






And the size of the observed ‘spike’ is given by:  





This is the contribution to the likelihood function for those paid the minimum wage. 
b.  Those Paid Below the Minimum Wage 
Now let us consider the contribution to the likelihood function for those below paid the 
minimum wage.   We need to work out the density function of actual observed wages w, where  
𝑤 < 𝑤𝑚. None of those who report their correct wages (i.e. have 𝐷 = 0) will report a sub-
minimum wage, so we need only consider those who mis-report their wage (i.e. those with 
𝐷 = 1).  Some of these will have a true wage equal to the minimum and some will have a true 
wage above the minimum.  Those who are truly paid the minimum will have measurement 
error equal to (𝑤 − 𝑤𝑚) so, using (A.19) and (A.20) the contribution to the likelihood function 
will be:  
(1 − 𝗾)
𝜌







Now, consider those whose true wage is above the minimum but have a measurement error 
that is below the minimum.  For this group we observe their observed latent wage below the 
minimum and know their true latent wage is above the minimum.  The fraction of those who 
mis-report who are in this category is, with some abuse of the concept of probability: 
Pr (𝑣 = 𝑤,𝑤∗ > 𝑤𝑚)  (A.23) 
Define: 39 
 
𝑣∗ = 𝑤∗ + ε  (A.24) 
Which is what the observed wage would be if there was no minimum wage and they mis-report 
i.e. 𝐷 = 1. 
































0 1 − 𝜌2
�� 
(A.26) 
Which is an orthogonalization that will be convenient. 
Now for those paid above the minimum but whose wage is mis-reported, the true wage is w* 
and the observed wage is v*.  So:  
Pr(𝑣=w, 𝑤∗ > 𝑤𝑚) = Pr (𝑣∗ = 𝑤,𝑤∗ > 𝑤𝑚)
= Pr (𝑣∗ = 𝑤,𝑤∗ − 𝜌2𝑣∗ > 𝑤𝑚 − 𝜌2𝑤)








[(𝑤𝑚 − 𝜇) − 𝜌2(𝑤 − 𝜇)]
𝜎𝑤�1 − 𝜌2 ��
  (A.27) 
where the third line uses the independence of (A.26). 
 
Putting together (A.22) and (A.27) the fraction of the population observed to be paid at a wage 
𝑤  below the minimum is given by: 



















[(𝑤𝑚 − 𝜇) − 𝜌2(𝑤 − 𝜇)]









c.  Those Paid Above the Minimum Wage 40 
 
Now let us consider the fraction observed above the minimum wage.  These workers might be 
one of three types: 
i.  Those really paid the minimum wage who mis-report a wage above the minimum 
ii.  Those really paid above the minimum wage who do not mis-report 
iii.  Those really paid above the minimum wage but who do mis-report but do not 
report a sub-minimum wage. 
For those who are truly paid the minimum wage and have a mis-reported wage, a half will be 














Now, consider those whose true wage is above the minimum but who mis-report.  For this 
group we know their observed latent wage is above the minimum and that their true latent 
wage is above the minimum.  The fraction who are in this category is: 
Pr(𝑤∗ > 𝑤𝑚,𝑣∗ > 𝑤𝑚)  (A.31) 
Now: 
Pr(𝑤∗ > 𝑤𝑚, 𝑣∗ > 𝑤𝑚)
= Pr(𝑤∗ > 𝑤𝑚) − Pr (𝑤∗ > 𝑤𝑚,𝑣∗ < 𝑤𝑚)
= Pr(𝑤∗ > 𝑤𝑚) − Pr (𝑤∗ − 𝜌2𝑣∗ > (1 − 𝜌2)𝑤𝑚,𝑣∗ < 𝑤𝑚)
= Pr(𝑤∗ > 𝑤𝑚) − Pr(𝑣∗ < 𝑤𝑚)Pr (𝑤∗ − 𝜌2𝑣∗ > (1 − 𝜌2)𝑤𝑚)












As this expression applies to those who mis-report, it needs to be multiplied by (1 − 𝗾) to give 
the fraction of the population in this category.  Putting together (A.29), (A.30), and (A.32) the 
fraction of the population observed to be paid above the minimum is given by:  41 
 





















  (A.33) 
This is the contribution to the likelihood function for those paid above the minimum. 
There are three parameters in this model (𝜎𝑤,𝗾,𝜌).  These parameters may vary with state or 
time.  In the paper we have already documented how the variance in observed wages varies 
across state and time so it is important to allow for this variation.  But, our main estimates 
assume that (𝗾,𝜌) only vary across time so are constant across states. 
To estimate the parameters we use two steps. 
We first use the estimation procedure described in section IV to obtain an estimate of the 
median and variance of the latent observed wage distribution.  This procedure assumes that 
the latent observed wage distribution is normal which is not consistent with our measurement 
error model which assumes that the latent observed wage distribution is a mixture of two 
normals (those who report their wage correctly and those who do not).  This does not affect the 
estimate of the median but does affect the interpretation of the variance.  Here we show how 
to map between this estimate of the variance and the parameters of our measurement error 
model. 
Step 1: 




































And our estimation procedure provides an estimate of 𝜎.  Equating the two terms we have the 
following expression for the relationship between 𝜎𝑤 and 𝜎: 
𝜎𝑤 = 𝜎
�𝗾𝜙 �𝑤(𝑝) − 𝜇
𝜎𝑤







If the values of the density functions are similar then one can approximate this relationship by:  
𝜎𝑤 = 𝜎[𝗾 + 𝜌(1 − 𝗾)]  (A.38) 
This is an approximation, but simulation of the model for the parameters we estimate suggest it 
is a good approximation.  This implies that we can write all elements of the likelihood function 







That is, 𝑧𝑠𝑡 is the standardized deviation of the minimum from the median using the estimate of 
the observed variance obtained as described above from step 1 of the estimation procedure. 
 
In this step we estimate the parameters (𝜌,𝗾) using maximum-likelihood.  The elements of the 





Allegretto, Sylvia, Arindrajit Dube, and Michael Reich. 2008. “Do Minimum Wages Really 
Reduce Teen Employment? Accounting for Heterogeneity and Selectivity in State Panel 
Data.” Institute for Research on Labor and Employment Working Paper (University of 
California, Berkeley) No. 166-08, June. 
Autor, David H., Lawrence F. Katz, and Melissa S. Kearney. 2008. “Trends in U.S. Wage 
Inequality: Revising the Revisionists.” Review of Economics and Statistics, 90(2), May, 300-
323. 
Bertrand, Marianne, Esther Duflo and Sendhil Mullainathan. 2004. “How Much Should we Trust 
Difference-in-Difference Estimators?” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(1), 249-275. 
Borjas, George J. 1980. “The Relationship between Wages and Weekly Hours of Work: The Role 
of Division Bias” Journal of Human Resources, 15(3) pp 409-423 
Card, David, Lawrence F. Katz and Alan B. Kruger. 1993. “An Evaluation of Recent Evidence on 
the Employment Effects of Minimum and Subminimum Wages.” NBER Working Paper No. 
4528, November.  
Card, David and Alan B. Krueger. 1994. “Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case Study of the 
Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania.” American Economic Review, 84(4), 
772-793  
Card, David and Alan B. Krueger. 2000. “Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case Study of the 
Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania: Reply.” American Economic Review, 
90(5), 1397-1420. 
Chernozhukov, Victor and Christian Hansen. 2005. “An IV Model of Quantile Treatment Effects.” 
Econometrica, 73(1), 245-261.  
DiNardo, John, Nicole M. Fortin and Thomas Lemieux. 1996. “Labor Market Institutions and the 
Distribution of Wages, 1973-1992: A semiparametric approach.” Econometrica, 64(5), 
September, 1001 -1044.  
Durbin, James. 1954. “Errors in Variables.” Review of the International Statistical Institute. 22, 
23–32. 
Lee, David. 1999. “Wage Inequality in the United States During the 1980s: Rising Dispersion or 
Falling Minimum Wage?” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(3), August, 977-1023. 
Manning, Alan. 2004. “We Can Work it Out: the Impact of Technological Change on the Demand 
for Low-Skill Workers.” Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 51(5), November, 581-608. 44 
 
Mishel, Lawrence, Jared Bernstein and Sylvia Allegretto. 2006. The State of Working America, 
2006/2007. New York: ILR Press 
Neumark, David and William Wascher. 2000. “Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case Study 
of the Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania: Comment.” American Economic 
Review, 90(5), 1362-1396. 
Stigler, George. 1946. “The Economics of Minimum Wage Legislation.” American Economic 
Review, 36, 358-365. 
Stock, James H., Jonathan H. Wright and Motohiro Yogo. 2002. “A Survey of Weak Instruments 
and Weak Identification in Generalized Method of Moments.”  Journal of Business and 
Economics Statistics, 20(4), October, 518-529.  
Teulings, Coen N. 2000. “Aggregation Bias in Elasticities of Substitution and the Minimum Wage 
Paradox,” International Economic Review, 41, 359–398. 
Teulings, Coen N. 2003. “The Contribution of Minimum Wages to Increasing Inequality.” 
Economic Journal, 113, October, 801-833. 
White, Hal. 1980. "Using Least Squares to Approximate Unknown Regression Functions," 
International Economic Review, 21, 149-170   
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. 1992. “Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data.” 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
 



























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1979 1 5.0 28.0 0.13 -0.38 2.0 10.5 0.05 -0.67
1980 1 6.0 24.0 0.13 -0.42 2.5 10.0 0.05 -0.68
1981 1 5.0 24.0 0.13 -0.40 1.5 9.0 0.06 -0.68
1982 1 5.0 21.5 0.11 -0.50 2.0 8.0 0.05 -0.69
1983 1 3.5 17.5 0.10 -0.53 2.0 8.0 0.05 -0.73
1984 1 2.5 15.5 0.09 -0.54 1.5 7.5 0.04 -0.78
1985 2 2.0 14.5 0.08 -0.58 1.0 6.5 0.04 -0.75
1986 5 2.0 16.0 0.07 -0.60 1.0 6.5 0.03 -0.77
1987 6 2.0 14.0 0.06 -0.62 1.0 6.0 0.03 -0.77
1988 10 2.0 12.5 0.06 -0.62 1.0 6.0 0.03 -0.74
1989 12 1.0 12.5 0.05 -0.63 1.0 5.0 0.03 -0.69
1990 11 1.5 13.0 0.06 -0.63 0.5 5.5 0.03 -0.74
1991 4 1.5 18.5 0.08 -0.61 1.0 8.5 0.04 -0.78
1992 7 2.0 13.5 0.06 -0.60 0.5 6.5 0.04 -0.75
1993 7 2.5 11.0 0.06 -0.60 1.0 5.0 0.03 -0.73
1994 8 2.5 11.0 0.06 -0.59 1.0 4.5 0.03 -0.73
1995 9 2.0 9.5 0.05 -0.60 0.5 4.5 0.03 -0.72
1996 11 2.5 9.5 0.05 -0.65 1.0 5.0 0.03 -0.69
1997 10 2.5 10.0 0.06 -0.62 1.0 6.5 0.04 -0.73
1998 7 2.5 11.5 0.06 -0.56 1.0 7.0 0.04 -0.69
1999 10 2.5 11.0 0.05 -0.60 1.0 5.5 0.03 -0.68
2000 10 2.0 9.5 0.05 -0.59 1.0 6.0 0.03 -0.71
2001 10 2.0 8.5 0.05 -0.61 1.0 5.5 0.03 -0.69
2002 11 1.5 9.0 0.04 -0.60 1.0 6.0 0.03 -0.69
2003 11 1.5 9.0 0.04 -0.61 0.5 5.0 0.03 -0.70
2004 12 1.5 7.5 0.04 -0.62 1.0 5.0 0.03 -0.69
2005 15 1.5 8.5 0.04 -0.66 1.0 5.0 0.03 -0.70
2006 19 1.5 9.5 0.04 -0.66 0.5 6.0 0.02 -0.74
2007 31 1.0 10.0 0.06 -0.65 0.5 6.5 0.04 -0.71
2008 32 1.5 11.0 0.06 -0.63 0.5 6.5 0.04 -0.69
2009 27 3.5 10.5 0.06 -0.63 2.0 7.0 0.04 -0.72
A. Females B. Males
Notes: Column 1 displays the number of states with a minimum that exceeds the federal minimum.
Columns 2 and 6, and 3 and 8 display estimates of the lowest and highest percentile at which the
minimum wage binds across states (DC is excluded). The binding percentile is estimated as the highest
percentile in the annual distribution of wages at which the minimum wage binds (rounded to the nearest
half of a percentile), where the annual distribution includes only those months for which the minimum
wage was equal to its modal value for the year. Columns 4 and 8 display the share of hours worked
for wages at or below the minimum wage. Columns 5 and 9 display the weighted average value of the
log(p50)-log(p10) for the male or female wage distributions across states.















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1979 1 3.5 17.0 0.08 -0.60
1980 1 4.0 15.5 0.08 -0.62
1981 1 2.5 14.5 0.09 -0.60
1982 1 3.5 12.5 0.07 -0.66
1983 1 3.0 11.5 0.07 -0.66
1984 1 2.0 10.5 0.06 -0.69
1985 2 1.5 9.5 0.06 -0.69
1986 5 1.5 10.0 0.05 -0.69
1987 6 1.5 9.0 0.04 -0.72
1988 10 1.5 8.0 0.04 -0.70
1989 12 1.0 7.0 0.04 -0.71
1990 11 1.0 8.0 0.04 -0.69
1991 4 1.5 12.5 0.06 -0.67
1992 7 1.5 9.5 0.05 -0.69
1993 7 1.5 7.5 0.04 -0.69
1994 8 2.0 7.5 0.04 -0.70
1995 9 1.5 6.0 0.04 -0.69
1996 11 1.5 6.5 0.03 -0.69
1997 10 2.0 7.5 0.05 -0.66
1998 7 2.0 7.5 0.05 -0.67
1999 10 2.0 7.0 0.04 -0.67
2000 10 1.5 7.5 0.04 -0.66
2001 10 1.5 6.5 0.04 -0.66
2002 11 1.5 7.0 0.03 -0.69
2003 11 1.5 6.5 0.03 -0.68
2004 12 1.5 6.0 0.03 -0.66
2005 15 1.5 6.5 0.03 -0.69
2006 19 1.0 7.5 0.03 -0.66
2007 31 1.0 7.5 0.04 -0.68
2008 32 1.0 7.5 0.05 -0.70
2009 27 2.5 8.5 0.05 -0.71
Table 1b - Summary Statistics for Bindingness of State and 
Federal Minimum Wages
C. Males and females, pooled
See notes for Table 1a.(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
5 0.61 0.44 0.34 0.37 0.52 0.26 0.21 0.18 0.60 0.36 0.30 0.27
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06)
10 0.51 0.30 0.27 0.16 0.35 0.16 0.09 0.07 0.42 0.23 0.22 0.16
(0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
20 0.27 0.14 0.11 0.05 0.19 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.24 0.10 0.06 0.06
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
30 0.15 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.13 0.07 0.03 0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
40 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.05 -0.01 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
75 -0.04 0.11 0.00 -0.02 0.10 0.14 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.12 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
90 -0.03 0.16 0.01 0.04 0.13 0.13 -0.02 0.01 0.04 0.15 0.02 0.02
(0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
OLS / 2SLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Levels or 
FD?
Levels Levels Levels FD Levels Levels Levels FD Levels Levels Levels FD
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
State 
trends
No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No
A. Females C. Males and females pooled B. Males
Notes: N=1450 for levels estimation, N=1400 for first-differenced estimation. Estimates are the marginal effects of log(min. wage)-log(p50), or
log(min)-predicted log(p50), evaluated at its hours-weighted average across states and years. Standard errors clustered at the state level are in
parenthesis. Regressions are weighted by the sum of individuals' reported weekly hours worked multiplied by CPS sampling weights. For 2SLS
specifications, the effective minimum and its square are instrumented by the log of the minimum, and the square of the fitted value from the first
stage regression of log(min.)-log(p50) on log(min) and controls.
Table 2: OLS and 2SLS relationship between log(p)-log(p50) and log(min. wage)-log(p50), for select percentiles of given wage distribution
Marginal effects, estimated from coefficients estimated over 1979-2009No Fe Levels First Diff No Fe Levels First Diff
Female 0.11 -0.07 0.00 0.07 -0.06 -0.08
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04)
Male 0.04 -0.08 -0.02 -0.02 -0.10 -0.11
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.05)
Pooled 0.09 -0.08 -0.01 0.07 -0.03 -0.06
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04)
2.Coefficient estimates for 1979 - 1991
Note: Estimates represent coefficient on log(p50) from regression of log(p60)-log(p40) on log(p50) and
year fixed effects and state fixed effects and state time trends, as indicated. Standard errors are in
parentheses. Regressions are weighted by the sum of individuals' reported weekly hours worked
multiplied by CPS sampling weights.  
1.Coefficient estimates for 1979 - 2009
Table 3: Relationship between log(p60)-log(p40) and log(p50): OLS estimatesOLS 2SLS 2SLS
No Fe Levels First Diff
Females 0.62 0.69 0.65
(0.03) (0.21) (0.18)
Males 0.39 0.35 0.10
(0.05) (0.29) (0.21)
Pooled 0.50 0.43 0.51
(0.04) (0.19) (0.16)
Females 0.56 0.34 0.30
(0.03) (0.08) (0.07)
Males 0.37 0.29 0.19
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07)
Pooled 0.45 0.39 0.38
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Females 0.51 0.27 0.16
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Males 0.35 0.09 0.07
(0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
Pooled 0.42 0.22 0.16
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
Table 4: Marginal effects of log(p50)-log(min) and its 
square on 50/10 inequality: Point estimates from 
various years
Note: Estimates represent marginal effects of changes
in log(p50)-log(min.) and its square on log(p50)-log(p10) 
between various years. Standard errors are in
parentheses. Estimates represent marginal effects
from regressions of the form reported in the first, third,
and fourth specifications of Table 2, and are evaluated
at the hours-weighted mean value of log(p50)-log(min)
across all states and the years listed in each panel.
B. 1979-1991
C. 1979-2009
A. 1979-1989Observed OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Change No Fe Levels First Diff No Fe Levels First Diff
Females 22.4 5.8 11.9 15.1 5.9 9.5 9.8
Males 11.2 6.4 10.7 10.4 6.6 9.7 9.3
Pooled 7.1 -1.5 3.8 4.1 -1.3 1.5 1.8
Females 23.4 3.2 10.6 14.9 3.7 8.6 8.2
Males 7.7 -0.2 6.7 6.5 0.3 5.1 4.7
Pooled 10.8 -1.1 5.8 7.0 -0.6 3.7 3.6
Females 25.2 3.2 10.7 15.6 3.4 8.9 8.7
Males 5.3 1.8 6.0 5.4 2.1 5.6 4.7
Pooled 11.4 0.2 7.0 8.2 1.0 5.0 4.9
Females 7.1 3.6 5.3 6.0 4.3 4.9 5.0
Males 2.7 0.4 2.4 2.4 0.5 2.0 1.7
Pooled 3.6 0.9 2.7 3.1 1.2 2.7 2.7
Note: Estimates represent changes in actual and counterfactual log(p50)-log(p10)
between 1979 and 1988, 1979 and 1991, 1979 and 2009, and 1998 and 2009,
measured in log points (100 x log change). Counterfactual wage changes in
panels A, B, and D represent counterfactual changes in the 50/10 had the
effective minimum wage in the earlier year equaled the effective minimum wage in
the later year for each state. Counterfactual wage changes in Panel C represent
changes had the effective minima in 1979 and 2009 equaled the effective
minimum in 1988. OLS counterfactual estimates are formed using coefficients
from estimation reported in column 1 of Table 2. 2SLS counterfactuals are formed
using coefficients from estimation reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.  
Table 5: Actual and counterfactual changes in log(p50/10) between selected 
years: Changes in log points (100 x log change)
D. 1998 - 2009
A. 1979 - 1991
 1. Counterfactuals using 
point estimates for 1979 - 
2009
2. Counterfactuals using 
point estimates for 1979 - 
1991
B. 1979 - 1988
C. 1979 - 20091979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Federal min. wage 2.90 3.10 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.80 4.25 4.25 4.25
Alabama
Alaska 3.40 3.60 3.85 3.85 3.85 3.85 3.85 3.85 3.85 3.85 3.85 4.30 4.75 4.75 4.75
Arizona
Arkansas
California 4.25 4.25 4.25
Colorado












Maine 3.45 3.55 3.65 3.65 3.75 3.85
Maryland
Massachusetts 3.65 3.65 3.75 3.75
Michigan






New Hampshire 3.45 3.55 3.65







Oregon 4.25 4.75 4.75 4.75
Pennsylvania












Appendix Table 1 - Variation in State Minimum Wages
Note: Table indicates years in which each state had a state minimum wage that exceeded the federal minimum wage for at least 6 months of 
the year.1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Federal min. wage 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.75 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.85 6.55
Alabama
Alaska 4.75 4.75 4.75 5.25 5.65 5.65 5.65 5.65 5.65 7.15 7.15 7.15 7.15 7.15 7.15 7.15
Arizona 6.75 6.90 7.25
Arkansas 6.25 6.25
California 5.00 5.75 5.75 5.75 6.25 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 7.50 8.00 8.00
Colorado 6.85 7.02 7.28
Connecticut 4.27 4.27 4.27 4.77 5.18 5.65 6.15 6.40 6.70 6.90 7.10 7.10 7.40 7.65 7.65 8.00
Delaware 4.65 5.65 5.65 6.15 6.15 6.15 6.15 6.15 6.15 6.65 7.15 7.15
Florida 6.15 6.40 6.67 6.79 7.21
Georgia
Hawaii 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.75 6.25 6.25 6.25 6.75 7.25 7.25 7.25
Idaho
Illinois 5.50 6.50 6.50 7.50 7.75 8.00
Indiana
Iowa 4.65 4.65 4.65 6.20 7.25 7.25
Kansas
Kentucky 5.85 6.55 7.25
Louisiana
Maine 5.75 6.25 6.25 6.35 6.50 6.75 7.00 7.25
Maryland 6.15 6.15 6.15
Massachusetts 4.75 5.25 5.25 5.25 6.00 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 7.50 8.00 8.00
Michigan 7.15 7.40 7.40
Minnesota 6.15 6.15 6.15
Mississippi sort 
Missouri 6.50 6.65 7.05
Montana 6.15 6.25 6.90
Nebraska
Nevada 6.33 6.85 7.55
New Hampshire
New Jersey 5.05 5.05 5.05 5.05 6.15 7.15 7.15 7.15
New Mexico 6.50 7.50
New York 6.00 6.75 7.15 7.15 7.15
North Carolina 6.15 6.15
North Dakota
Ohio 6.85 7.00 7.30
Oklahoma
Oregon 4.75 4.75 4.75 5.50 6.00 6.50 6.50 6.50 6.50 6.90 7.05 7.25 7.50 7.80 7.95 8.40
Pennsylvania 7.15 7.15 7.15






Vermont 4.50 4.75 5.00 5.25 5.25 5.75 6.25 6.25 6.25 6.75 7.00 7.25 7.53 7.68 8.06
Virginia
Washington 4.90 4.90 4.90 4.90 5.70 6.50 6.72 6.90 7.01 7.16 7.35 7.63 7.93 8.07 8.55
West Virginia 5.85 6.55 7.25 7.25
Wisconsin 5.70 6.50 6.50 6.5
Wyoming
Appendix Table 1 (cont) - Variation in State Minimum Wages, cont.
Note: Table indicates years in which each state had a state minimum wage that exceeded the federal minimum wage for at least 6 months of 
the year.Figure 1: Share of hours at or below the minimum wage
Note: Lines are estimates of the share of hours worked for reported wages equal to or less than the applicable 




















































1979 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2009
Female Male
Male/female pooledFigure 2A: Trends in state and federal minimum wages, and log(p10)-log(p50)





























































































1974 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2009
Real value of average state/federal mins Real value of fed. min.
log(p10)-log(p50), female log(p10)-log(p50), male






















































































1974 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2009
Real value of average state/federal mins Real value of fed. min.
log(p90)-log(p50), female log(p90)-log(p50), male
Note: Annual data on state and federal minimum wages and log percentiles. Minimum wages are in 2009 dollars.Figure 3: OLS estimates of the relationship between log(p)-log(p50) and log(min)-log(p50) or log(min) and its square, 1979-2009
Note: Estimates are the marginal effects of log(min. wage)-log(p50), evaluated at the hours-weighted average of log(min. wage)-log(p50) across
states and years. Observations are state-year observations. 95% confidence interval is represented by the dashed lines. Panels A and C

























0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

























0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

























0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

























0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

























0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

























0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
F. Males and females - state FE and trends
Note: Estimates are the marginal effects of log(min. wage)-log(p50), evaluated at the hours-weighted average of log(min. wage)-
log(p50) across states and years. Observations are state-year observations. 95% confidence interval is represented by the dashed
lines. Panel E corresponds with column 1 of Table 2. Panels F corresponds with column 2 of Table 2.Figure 4: 2SLS estimates of the relationship between log(p)-log(p50) and log(min)-log(p50), 1979-2009
Note: Estimates are the marginal effects of log(min. wage)-pred. log(p50), evaluated at the hours-weighted average of log(min. wage)-pred. log(p50)
across states and years. Observations are state-year observations. 95% confidence interval is represented by the dashed lines. Panels A and C
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0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
F. Males and females - 2SLS, first-differenced (state FE)
Note: Estimates are the marginal effects of log(min. wage)-pred. log(p50), evaluated at the hours-weighted average of log(min. wage)-
pred. log(p50) across states and years. Observations are state-year observations. 95% confidence interval is represented by the
dashed lines. Panel E corresponds with column 3 of Table 2, Panel F with column 4.Figure 5A: Marginal effects of change in log(min)-log(p50) on all percentiles
Female wage distribution, estimation from 1979 to 2009
Figure 5B: Marginal effects of change in log(min)-log(p50) on all percentiles
Male wage distribution, estimation from 1979 to 2009
Note: Observations are state-year observations. "OLS, no state effects" plots the marginal effects of the effective
minimum from regressions of log(p)-log(p50) on the effective minimum, its square, and year fixed effects. "2SLS,
state time trends" plots the marginal effects from 2SLS regressions that include state and year fixed effects, and state
time trends. "OLS, time trends" replaces the effective minimum with the predicted effective minimum wage (as
described in the text), and includes state and year fixed effects, and state time trends in the regressions. "Quantile
regression, no state effects" plot the marginal effects from quantile regressions of the log wage on the effective
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OLS reduced form Quantile reduced formNote: Plots represent the actual and counterfactual changes in the 5th through 95th percentiles of the male wage
distribution. Counterfactual changes are calculated by adjusting the 1979 wage distributions by the value of states'
effective minima in 1988 using coefficients from OLS regressions without state fixed effects for which the minimum
wage regressor is log(min)-log(p50) (column 1 of table 2) and 2SLS regressions with state fixed effects and time
trends or first-differenced 2SLS regressions with state fixed effects (columns 3 and 4 of table 2). 
Figure 6B: Actual and counterfactual change in log(p)-log(p50)
Male wage distribution, 1979 to 1988
Figure 6A: Actual and counterfactual change in log(p)-log(p50)
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Actual change Cntfct. change, no state FE
Cntfct. change, state time trends Cntfct. change, FDNote: Plots represent the actual and counterfactual changes in the 5th through 95th percentiles of the male and
female pooled wage distribution. Counterfactual changes in Panel A are calculated by adjusting the 1979 wage
distributions by the value of states' effective minima in 1988 using coefficients from OLS regressions (column 1 of
table 2) and 2SLS regressions (columns 5 and 6 of table 2). Counterfactual changes in Panel B are calculated by
adjusting both the 1979 and 2009 wage distributions by the value of states' effective minima in 1988 using coefficients
from OLS regressions (column 1 of table 2) and 2SLS regressions (columns 5 and 6 of table 2). 
Figure 7A: Actual and counterfactual change in log(p)-log(p50)
Male and female pooled wage distribution, 1979 to 1988
Figure 7B: Actual and counterfactual change in log(p)-log(p50)


















































0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Percentile
Actual change Cntfct. change, no state FE














































0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Percentile
Actual change Cntfct. change, no state FE
Cntfct. change, state time trends Cntfct. change, FDFigure 8: Theoretical relationship between deviations in the minimum and latent wage percentile, and 
differences between the minimum wage and latent percentile
Note: w(p)-w(p)* is the difference between the actual (observed) value of percentile p and the latent value of percentile p (i.e.
its value in the absence of a minimum wage). log(min)-w(p)* is the difference between the minimum and the latent value of
percentile p.
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Note: Deviations are averaged across all states and years. See text for description of how devs. are computed.Figure 10: Total, direct, and spillover effects of the minimum wage on the log(50)-log(10), by gender and year
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SpilloverFigure 11: Comparison of changes in actual, latent and counterfactual 50-10 inequality 
Notes: All series show changes in the indicated measure relative to its 1979 level. The 2SLS counterfactual 10-50 is estimated using
regression coefficients from 2SLS estimation in first-differences with state and year fixed effects. The OLS counterfactual is estimated from
OLS regression estimates with year fixed effects. Latent 10-50 is estimated by subtracting the total minimum wage effect on the 10-50 (what is
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2SLS counterfactual (FD) Latent 10-50Figure 12: Comparison of estimated effects of the minimum on the mean and density at the true spike
Notes: Mean effects represent the average marginal effects of the minimum wage (weighted across states), estimated from 2SLS regressions
of log(mean)-log(min) on the effective minimum and its square, year and state fixed effects, and state time trends (in the 2SLS levels
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